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ABSTRACT
Partnership for Peace 
İslam Yusuf
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan
European security has undergone profound changes since 1989. In this situation the 
Central and Eastern Europe Countries (CEEC) have been trying to find a security 
umbrella in NATO, which was seen as a key basis of security in post-Cold War 
Europe. At the Brussels Summit of 10-11 January 1994, the Alliance, issued an 
invitation to the CEEC able an willing to join NATO’s new cooperative framework, 
namely, the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The PfP is a practical programme going 
beyond a dialogue and cooperation, and aimed to design to forge a partnership 
between the Alliance and the CEEC. This thesis describes the PfP programme and its 
activities in PfP related areas of cooperation. It begins with a review of PfP’s origins, 
development and enhancement. It then examines the structure and usefulness of the 
PfP. It evaluates the political and military effects of the PfP to participating states. It 
concludes with a view that the PfP has led to a high degree of self-differentiation 
among partners and has shifted CEEC’ attitudes toward PfP from one of scepticism to 
one of enthusiastic support, and that it has become an important stage in the 
enlargement of NATO.
Ill
ÖZET
Banş İçin Ortaklık (Partnership for Peace) 
İslam Yusuf
Danışman: Prof Dr. Yüksel İnan
Soğuk savaşın bitmesiyle, Avrupa güvenlik sistemi büyük bir değişim geçirmiştir. 
Sovyetler Birliği ve Varşova Paktı’nın çökmesi, komünizmden demokrasiye geçiş 
yapan Orta ve Doğu Avrupa Ülkeleri’nin (ODAÜ) yeni dönemde Batı Avrupa ile 
bütünleşmeyi ve özellikle NATO ile entegre olmayı, dış politikalanmn ana amacı 
olarak seçmelerine neden olmuştur. NATO ülkeleri, ODAÜ’nün bu isteklerine cevap 
vermek, ve Avrupa’mn doğusundaki güvenlik ve istikrarı artırmak amacıyla, 10-11 
Ocak 1994 tarihinde Brüksel’de yapılan liderler zirvesinde, İttifak’la ODAÜ 
arasındaki ilişkileri ortaklık düzeyine çıkaracak olan Banş İçin Ortaklık (BİO) 
programını kabul ettiler. BİO, gelecekte Avrupa’da kurulacak olan kapsamlı güvenlik 
mimarisinin temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu master tezinde BİO’nun neden ortaya atıldığı 
araştırılmakta, daha sonra programın içeriği ve yapısı İncelenmektedir. Tez, BİO’nun 
ODAÜ’ye olan politik ve askeri etkilerini ortaya koymaktadır. Bunların yam sıra, BİO 
üye ülkelerinin perspektifleri gözönünde bulundurularak, programın genel olarak 
Doğu Avrupa güvenliğine olan etkileri sunulmaktadır.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Europe which have 
radically affected the security environment. All the countries that were formerly 
adversaries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have dismantled the 
Warsaw Pact (WP) and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in 
varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving 
pluralistic democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, a market economy and 
membership in the western organisations.
NATO’s January 1994 Brussels Summit started a new stage in NATO’s history and 
finally reconsidered its military-political role and the place of the organisation in the 
changing world. NATO leaders became aware that they had to form a programme 
that would transform the political and military relationship with Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC). Thus, they put forward the idea of the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP), which goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership, 
which will allow CEEC to determine the scope and pace of their relationship with the 
Alliance.’
' George A. Joulwan, “NATO’s Military Contribution to Partnership for Peace: the Progress and the 
Challenge,” NATO Review. Vol. 43, No. 2, (March 1995), p. 5.
PfP is more than a programme of activities. It also aims at developing closer political 
ties.' The program has a positive and strategically important potential for all CEEC. 
PfP offers CEEC certain strategic advantages. But its success or failure will be 
determined by the concrete mechanisms of its implementation. The response to 
NATO’s invitation has been impressive. A year after its inception, PfP had 25 
Partners (now 24 excluding the three new NATO members of Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary).^
The scope of this thesis is to describe the PfP process. The aim is to present an in- 
depth understanding about the evolution, process, structure and implications of the 
PfP and finally, to assess what PfP means for selected countries. The emphasis will be 
placed on how the PfP process has affected CEEC politically and militarily.
This thesis comprises three chapters. Following the introduction, the first chapter 
examines the evolution of the PfP in the framework of the new security situation in 
Europe. The chapter begins with describing the new security order that appeared in 
the post-Cold War Europe. The next sections provide an assessment of NATO’s 
adaptation to the new security environment. Finally, the development that led to the 
establishment of PfP are identified.
The second chapter focuses on the PfP itself as to what PfP is, what it involves: what 
are its purposes and objectives; what is its structure. The chapter begins with a 
description of goals, procedures, operation and the organs of the PfP. The chapter
■ See Appendix A, p. 96.
 ^See Appendix C, p. 101.
identifies specific activities in each area of cooperation of the PfP. The chapter then 
describes the changes that have appeared in the military systems of the PfP members. 
The chapter concludes with a description of the Enhanced PfP which started in 1997.
The third and last chapter expounds on how the states concerned perceive the PfP 
process. The chapter identifies the impact of PfP on Rusia, Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, the Baltic and the Balkan states. In all the three chapters a 
descriptive method is followed. The thesis nears the end with concluding remarks.
The period considered in the study ranges from 1990 to 1999. The reason for 
covering the years between 1990 and 1994, that is the years before the establishment 
of the PfP, is to describe the changed security landscape in Europe and the 
developments that has led to the adoption of the PfP programme. This study covers 
all aspects of cooperation and activities in the framework of the PfP, which ranges 
from ensuring democratic control of defence forces to achieving interoperability 
between NATO allies and CEEC.
Secondary sources are mainly used for the purposes of this study. But the data which 
describes the structure of the PfP and selected national perspectives on the PfP, rests 
on primary sources in the form of official documents as well as newspapers, news 
magazines and the first hand information provided by newsagencies, such as the New 
York Times, the Economist, and Reuters News Service. The second and third 
chapters rely heavily on information supplied by these sources.
The existing literature on the PfP, has so far been papers which focus only on some 
aspects of the PfP, such as Hugh De Santis’ study “Romancing NATO-Partnership for 
Peace and East European Stability”'* and ‘The Brussels Summit: A Military 
Perspective” by Richard Vincent.^ Their prescription remain largely irrelevant to the 
purposes of this study, which is to describe the PfP programme. This study is hoped 
to be useful as a handbook on the PfP process.
Hugh De Santis, “Romancing NATO - PfP and East European Stability,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies. Vol. 17, No. 4, (1994).
 ^ Richard Vincent, “The Brussels Summit; A Military Perspective”, NATO Review. Vol. 42, No. 1, 
(February 1994).
CHAPTER I
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
1.1 The New European Order
This chapter is about the developments that led to the establishment of the Partnership 
for Peace Programme. European security has undergone profound changes since 
1989. The collapse of communism and the demise of the Soviet Union (SU) 
completed a process of change which led to a new European order.^ In this new 
European order, the former communist countries have been trying to carve out a 
place for themselves and to find a security umbrella in the European Union (EU) and 
the NATO. In this new era, in which the WP, the former Soviet Union (USSR) and 
Yugoslavia, communist regimes, and the threat of a major war have all disappeared.
The new order was marked with revolutions in CEEC and transformations from 
communism to democracy.^ In November 1990 within the context of the Conference
 ^ Ferguss Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order. London, St. Martin’s Press, 
1996, p. 132.
 ^ Robert Kennedy, “Current Situation Arrangements and Models for the Future; An American 
View,” in Cooperative Security Arrangements in Europe, edited by NATO Defence College, Vol. 5, 
New York, Peter Lang, 1997, p. 101.
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in Paris, NATO and the WP 
agreed a treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe (CEE).* In February 1991 
the new order was taken a stage further when representatives of the WP meeting in 
Budapest agreed to the dissolution of its military structure.^
A new political agenda has developed in the former communist states. Nationalism, 
ethnic conflict, intra-state conflict and separatism have become important features of 
politics in parts of CEE. Pre-communist politics have been reasserted in the new 
setting of the post-communist era. Nationalism and ethnic conflict have challenged the 
integrity of states and led in some instances to inter-state conflict.The demise of the 
SU also complicated the process of nuclear arms control and raised the question of 
weapon proliferation.“ The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of 
NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides 
the focus for Allied strategy in the new European order. However, the new order is 
not entirely free of security tensions, challenges and risks.“ Challenges and risks to 
Allied security are likely to result from the adverse consequences of instabilities that
CFE fundamentally reduced the conventional threat to European security, placing ceilings on 
different categories of weapons and preventing any single state holding more than one-third of the 
combined total of both alliances. The treaty was applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals and it 
limited each Alliance (NATO and WP) to the following numbers of key offensive systems: (20, 000 
Tanks, 20, 000 Artillery pieces, 30, 000 Armoured combat vehicles, 6, 800 Combat aircraft, 2, 000 
Attack helicopters). Following the dissolution of the WP, the ceilings of the WP were allocated to its 
former member countries.
 ^ Keesing’s Record of World Events. (1989), p. 3711.
Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, ‘Turkey and NATO in a New Strategic Environment,” unpublished paper, 
presented at the Conference on “Mediterranean Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” Naples, Italy, 27 
February - 1 March 1995, p. 2.
" The Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear forces were passed on to four successor states, namely, the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In December 1991 at Alma Ata the four 
successor states agreed to place strategic forces under one unified control and honour the 
international obligations of the (FSU). The Ukraine and Belarus announced their intention to join the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and transfer their nuclear forces to the Russian Federation.
'■ Gary Guertner, NATO Strategy in a New World. New York, Crane Russak, 1992, p. 116.
may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic 
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many CEEC.
There are several aspects that are generally regarded as security challenges and risks 
the Europe is facing or might face in future:
i. Uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the 
possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could 
evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face 
serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious 
rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the 
abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and 
even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises 
affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. 
Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into 
neighbouring countries.'^
ii. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trafficking of fissile material 
and the nuclear burden;
iii. Migration: The attractiveness of the EU for illegal immigration is linked to 
the economic disequilibrium between Europe and its neighbouring regions. 
As the war in former Yugoslavia has shown, an armed conflict can lead to a 
large scale displacement of persons. Through migration, conflicts between 
opposing political, religious or ethnic groups can be ‘imported’ into the 
host country. And, the host country has not only to consider the financial
The Alliance's Strategic Concept. NAC-S(99)65, (24 April 1999).
implications of migration, but also indirect social costs, caused through 
hostile or violent reactions by its own population;*'*
iv. Environmental damage: Large scale environmental damage surrounding 
Europe can be observed to the east, eg. in the Baltic Sea region and the 
south, eg. the Mediterranean Sea, caused by emissions from industry, 
nuclear installations, dumping of hazardous waste, etc.
V. Trade routes and energy supply: At present no indications can be found 
that Europe’s energy supply eg. from Russia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) or its trade routes in the Mediterranean are 
threatened by third countries. Nevertheless, the dependence of Europe on 
an external energy supply and raw materials or simply due to its high rate of 
export trade make it necessary to be certain that possible conflicts do not
harm these areas. 16
vi. The other risk is the increasing “underground organisations” (Mafia), 
which control already a great part of the society in the new democracies. 
This could undermine the stability of the Central and East European 
Countries (CEECs).
Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century,” International 
Affairs. (July 1991), pp. 431-451.
Especially in the Baltic Sea region non-military uncertainties became visible mainly in the form of 
environmental threats. The environment in the Barents-Euro Arctic Region is seriously polluted by 
emissions from industry, nuclear installations, and the dumping of hazardous waste. And in several 
of the transforming economies of eastern Europe industrial waste, radioactive material or military- 
related environmental damage have become serious problems. These are the risks that are posed also 
by the numerous nuclear reactors that are in serious disrepair. These include not only reactors in the 
former Soviet Union republics (Smolensk, Kursk, Moscow, St. Petersburg), but also reactors in 
Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria (Kozioduy) and Lithuania (Ignalia). The chance that ecological 
disasters occur will increase considerably if a nuclear plant lies in a conflict area.
Kurt H. Biedenkopf, “Facing the Challenge of Upheaval in Europe”, NATO Review, Vol. 42, No. 
3, (June 1994), pp. 15-7.
The above mentioned risks and challenges cannot exclusively be seen as risks to the 
security of the west European countries. These are risks that are faced also by CEEC. 
The dissolution of the SU and the WP, the end of the Cold War antagonism and the 
opening of western Europe to CEECs have altered the security situation of these 
countries. With the transformation of their political and economic systems they 
initiated attempts at defining and developing specific national concepts for foreign and 
security policy.
1.1.1. A Special Focus on Central and Eastern Europe
Regarding risks and challenges, several of the CEEC are concerned about the 
accountability and predictability of Russia’s foreign policy. The Baltic countries 
would be especially vulnerable to the “near abroad’’*^ policy of Russia. Inter-ethnic or 
minority problems are possible sources for instability throughout the CEE area.'* 
Internal aspects of security are more often perceived as a danger to the respective 
country’s stability than external challenges. The CEEC are even more vulnerable to 
such risks than western countries because the transformation processes of their 
economies and political systems have not yet been completed, or have not yet proved 
to be stable against increasing risks. No matter how different the security situation is 
perceived in the CEECs, the establishment of a dialogue and different forms of
Near Abroad is the notion that assumes that the Russian Federation has right to intervene to the 
former Soviet Republics, in case the interests of the Russian Federation are threatened or are at stake.
Hungary is concerned about the situation of the Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. 
Possible claims of Sudeten Germans are discussed in the Czech Republic. The situation of the Roma 
and Sinti in Slovakia is not clear. Romania too is trying to manage the question of how to integrate
cooperation with western organisations are evaluated as important steps for shaping 
one’s own foreign and security political profiles. This is a natural response to the 
conditions of a conceptual and material vacuum in which these countries perceived
their security. 19
For Western Europe, the situation in CEE cannot be ignored. Their own security 
concerns across the full range of issues depend on a stable situation within this region 
free from the dominance of a single power. Thus, they must support the moves 
towards democracy and a free market economy with more than rhetoric if they are to 
achieve their aim of a stable European security order.“° Czech President, Vaclav 
Havel, commented upon this to a NATO audience in 1991, saying that their countries 
“are dangerously sliding into a certain political, economic and security vacuum. The 
old, imposed political, economic and security ties have collapsed, yet new ones are 
developing slowly and with difficulty, if at all.” ‘^ The withdrawal of the SU has left, 
according to Vaclav Havel, a security vacuum, which requires filling."^
After 1989, CEECs faced a number of theoretical security policy options. These 
options could be summed up under few headings. The first option was to rebuild the 
old links with Russia with a hope to restore the credibility of Russia’s security 
guarantee. The essential condition for this option would be full political and legal
ethnic minorities, especially the Hungarians in the Transilvania region. Estonia is aware of the 
potential of the Russian population in case of a conflict.
Laszlo Valki, “ Security Concerns in Central Europe”, in Central European Security concerns: 
bridge, buffer or barrier?, edited by Jacob Kipp, London, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1993, p. 5.
Andrew M. Dorman and Adrian Treacher, European Security: An Introduction to Security Issues 
in Post-Cold War Europe, Sydney, Dartmouth, 1995, p. 86.
■' Daniel Nelson, “In the Wake of Revolution: Eastern Europe in the 1990s”, European Security, 
Vol. 1, No. 1, (Spring 1992), p. 92.
20
10
equality in future relations between Russia and other East European states. What 
matters is Russia’s internal development towards democracy and a strong economy, 
engagement in conflicts with neighbours, and attitude toward other nations aspiring 
toward independence. When judged by these criteria, this option did not look very 
plausible. Second option: Pursue neutrality and self-defence. The following theoretical 
conditions to make neutrality and self-defence credible need to be fulfilled; i. a 
powerful economy; ii. a well-functioning system of a pan-European collective 
security. Neither of these conditions exists at present and are not likely in the 
foreseeable future. Third option; Build a regional security system among the small- 
and medium-sized states surrounding the countries. This option presupposes a 
common will of states concerned and cohesion in their foreign and security policy. 
Again, despite the existence of various regional economic and political initiatives 
(e.g., the so-called Visegrad Group, the Central European initiative, or the Council of 
the Baltic States), the states taking part in these ventures have no desire to create 
security alliance. Fourth option: Pursue integration with the Euro-Atlantic security 
system.· They chose the option of pursuing integration with the Euro-Atlantic 
security system, particularly NATO. This option was and is the most advantageous as 
it not only provides a credible security guarantee, but also assures them accelerated 
military and political development.
Hermann de Wulf and Douglas Barrie, “USA Set to Bounce Czech Bid for F-16s”, Flight 
International. Vol. 146, No. 4,440, (28 September - 4 October 1994), p. 4 
Thomas G. Otte, “NATO’s Role After the Cold War,” Arms Control. Vol. 14, No. 2, (August 
1993), p. 157.
11
For a brief time there was speculation in the United States (US) and Western Europe 
that the collapse of the SU’s East European empire, followed by the disintegration of 
the SU itself, might signal NATO’s ultimate demise as well. It was difficult to 
envision an alliance that had been created to contain the expansionist ambitions of a 
totalitarian superpower playing a meaningful role in the absence of a such a threat. 
But NATO’s defenders have worked hard to ensure that the alliance is even more 
important in the post-Cold War era than it was during the Cold War.
It has been within the context of existing institutions like the CSCE, now the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), since January 1995, 
the Western European Union (WEU), and NATO that new security arrangements 
have been considered. Since each of these institutions has contributed in their own 
ways to European security and stability and the ending of the Cold War, and each 
comes with its own sets of strengths in dealing with the post-Cold War problems, 
member states have found it valuable to enhance rather than diminish the role of these 
institutions in the post-Cold War era.
1.1.2.1. NATO’s Functions in the New European Order
It is possible to identify four specific reasons why NATO has continued to be relevant 
in the new environment. Firstly, there is its long-standing role of providing insurance 
against the uncertainty and instability in and around Euro-Atlantic area, which may
1.1.2. NATO in the Post-Cold War Era
12
lead to local and regional crises. Secondly, the Alliance provides by its very existence 
a framework of stability at a time of great uncertainty and potential instability. CEE 
leaders have been prominent in arguing that, as the only functioning security 
organisation, NATO remains essential to European security. Thirdly, the Alliance is 
the mechanism that associates North America, and especially the US, most directly 
with the security of Europe. A fourth reason why the Atlantic Alliance has survived is 
simply that the nineteen member countries continue to see NATO as providing a 
convenient and effective framework within which they can meet, consult and, 
wherever necessary, coordinate policies. For these reasons it is generally 
acknowledged that NATO has continued to play a role in preserving stability and 
security in Europe.““*
On 14 December 1989 the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wbrner, gave a 
speech in which he argued that NATO would have to fulfil three new roles:
i. To promote the success of political reform in CEE;
ii. To secure the implementation of CEE agreement;
hi. To consider a new architecture for the post-Cold War era.“^
For his part, then American Secretary of State, James Baker, wanted NATO to offer 
“a vision of cooperation not coercion, of open borders not iron curtains.
Karaosmanoglu, p. 3.
Christopher Coker, “The Draughtman’s Contract: the Search for a European Security 
Architecture,” in The Cold War Legacy in Europe, edited by Otto Pick, London, Printer Publishers, 
1992, p. 37.
Ted Galen Carpenter, Bevond NATO: Staving Out of Europe’s Wars, Washington, D. C., Cato 
Institute, 1994, pp. 1-2.
26
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NATO’s new missions have evolved through planning and practice since 1990. 
Throughout this time NATO has developed capabilities to coordinate and implement 
collective security missions. It has developed a framework of military cooperation 
with the WEU as its support to the development of a European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI),·’ the most significant aspect of which has been the development of 
the Combined Joint Task Forces (CITE)’* capability
I.I.2.2. Transformed NATO
At the NATO summit in London in July 1990 the leaders of the Alliance affirmed their 
determination to adapt the Alliance to the new political and strategic realities. They 
announced that they would enhance the political component of the Alliance, extend 
the hand of friendship to former adversaries and strengthen the OSCE process. They 
also declared that NATO would profoundly alter its thinking about defence, and in so 
doing “prepare a new allied military strategy, moving away from forward defence^®
Its purpose is to enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to 
the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of their shared responsibilities and to 
reinforce the transatlantic relationship.
CJTF concept was launched at the NATO summit in January 1994. A CJTF is a deployable 
multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific contingency operations. At 
the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996, the CJTF’s conceptual 
phase was completed and the military planning and implementation of the CJTF commenced.
Giilnur Aybet, “NATO’s New Missions,” Perception. Vol. 4, No. 1, (March-May 1999), p. 74.
Forward defence is the strategy that supports the immediate use of the nuclear weapons against 
any Soviet aggression in Central Europe. According to the strategy, preparations for defence must be 
designed to guarantee an immediate and effective response to instil in the people the necessary 
feeling of security and confidence. For more information on forward defence see, Carl H. Amme, 
NATO Strategy and Nuclear Defence.” Greenwood Press, New York, 1988, pp. 22-3.
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where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence^' and modifying flexible 
response^^ to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.
Russia was undergoing the change from communism to capitalism. It is in a 
transitional phase. And that transitional phase is called alcoholism, a word used by 
Nicholas W illiam s.In a way, NATO has been in this alcoholic phase, a transitional 
phase for a number of years. We can see two elements to the changes that NATO has 
been going through. First of all, NATO has become more political than military in the 
past few years. It spends more time consulting, debating, exchanging diplomatic 
information. The second change is that NATO has become more concerned with 
stability. NATO wants to carry out major military restructuring. NATO does not own 
military forces. It coordinates so as to create a collective capacity which could be 
used in the collective interest. Collectively they have created a much more flexible 
military system which allows NATO forces to engage in missions beyond NATO 
territory, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994-95 and in Kosovo in 1999.
Forward presence means reduced peacetime presence and lower state of readiness of nuclear 
weapons. For more information on forward presence see, Michael C. Pugh, European Security- 
Towards 2000, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, p. 43.
Since 1967 flexible response has been the official strategy of NATO. Central to the strategy is the 
notion of punishments of another state for transgression against the deterrer's interests. The strategy 
assumes that NATO would try to convince the Soviets that the Alliance would respond to any attack 
but that its response might initially be conventional, reserving the right to use nuclear weapons. For 
more information on flexible response see, James H. Wyllie, European Security in the Nuclear Age. 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp. 8-91.
”  The London Declaratoin On a Transformed NATO Alliance. Brussels, NATO Information 
Service, (5-6 July 1990).
Nicholas Williams, “Europe’s Perspective on European Security,” SAM Papers. Ankara, No. 
04/97, p. 3.
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By November 1991, NATO had adopted a New Strategic Concept, replacing the 
1967 concept of Flexible Response which had focused on the Soviet threat. This new 
Strategic Concept noted that there were still risks and uncertainties associated with 
the fact that Russian conventional forces remained significantly larger than those of 
any other European state and that the Russian nuclear arsenal was comparable only to 
that of the US. However, the New Strategic Concept also noted that the "... risks to 
Allied security ... are multifaceted in nature and ... are less likely to result from 
calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse 
consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and 
political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced 
by many CEEC.”^^
The New Concept of 1991 survived until 1999, when NATO leaders at the 
Washington Summit on 23-25 April 1999, taking into consideration that almost all of 
CEEC have adopted the policy of integration to NATO, approved a New Strategic 
Concept, that would respond to the new needs and would adapt the Alliance more 
effectively to the changed environment.^^ The updated concept reaffirms NATO’s
1.1.2.3. New Strategic Concept
The Alliance’s Startegic Concept. Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, (November 
1991), p. 4.
Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey”, in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political 
Attitudes in 16 European Countries, edited by Harald Müller, Frankfurt, PRIF, European 
Interumversity Press, 1998, pp. 184-5.
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commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link, but at the same time gives 
the Alliance a key role to play in crisis situations beyond its borders.^’
1.2. Steps Tovrard the Establishment of the Partnership for Peace
The adapted Alliance to the changed environment in Europe, has become of 
increasing importance to the CEEC. The Alliance has been seen as a key basis of 
security in the new Europe order. The CEEC have sought a security guarantee by 
joining to the Alliance. This wish, has been labelled as a “return to Eu r ope , wh i c h  
means the acceptance of Western values, institutions, and political practices. Thus 
they established a dialogue with NATO, then they moved to the cooperation stage, 
which later led to the partnership.
1.2.1. Steps for Friendship
The Alliance taking into consideration the political and military transformation in 
CEEC, decided to move from dialogue to a new level, to that of friendship with 
CEEC. The decisions on friendship were taken in the London and the Copenhagen 
Summit of NATO leaders.
”  NATODOC<natodoc@HQ.NATO.INT>, (25 April 1999).
A word that has been used widely by leaders of CEEC after the cold war.
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NATO extended its first “hand of friendship” to CEECs at the London Summit July 5- 
6, 1990. The action programme decided on by Heads of State and Government in the 
Summit contained five key elements;
i. The establishment of a new relationship with the countries of CEE, 
once allied against NATO in the WP but now seeing in the Alliance 
a willing partner in their desire to draw closer to the West, and 
overcome a sense of isolation and insecurity;
ii. The elaboration of a new military strategy that would not only 
reflect the fact that NATO no longer faces a single overwhelming 
threat but which would also allow the Alliance to manage the more 
probable security challenges and crises it will face in the future;
iii. The determination to strengthen the CSCE, now OSCE, and endow 
it with permanent institutions that would make CSCE more 
effective as a pan-European forum for cooperation and an 
instrument for managing crises and peacefully settling disputes;
iv. A commitment to pursue the arms control process beyond the CEE 
Treaty with the aim of limiting the offensive potential of armed 
forces to the point at which surprise attack or major aggression 
would become impossible. A related aim would be to build trust and 
transparency with regard to the military activities of all CSCE 
states, and finally
1.2.1.1. The London Summit
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V. The encouragement of a European security identity and defence 
role, reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the 
Alliance, as a means of creating a more balanced and mature 
transatlantic partnership of equals.
The diplomatic liaison relationship established with the CEEC, at the London Summit 
led to a number of visits to NATO Headquarters by both the political and military 
leaders of the CEECs, most notably President Havel of the Czech Republic, President 
Walesa of Poland, Prime Minister Antall of Hungary, President Zhelev of Bulgaria, 
the President of Romania as well as President Gorbachev and other political leaders of 
the ESU,"*® the visits that to some extent shaped the orientation of CEEC to the 
western organisations.
I.2.I.2. The Copenhagen Summit
In NATO’s Copenhagen Summit of 6-7 June 1991, NATO gave special attention to 
the new situation in CEE by taking the decision “to intensify ... (NATO’s) program 
of military contacts at various levels”"*’ with CEE states. It was stated in the 
Declaration on Partnership with the countries of CEE that the security of the NATO 
countries was inseparably linked to the security of all other states in Europe. The 
consolidation and preservation of democratic societies throughout the continent and
London Declaration On a Transformed NATO Alliance. Brussels, NATO Information Service, (5- 
6 July, 1990), Articles 7, and 8.
Manfred Wdrner, “NATO Transformed: the Significance of the Rome Summit,” NATO Review, 
Vol. 39, No. 6, (Decemeber 1991), pp. 3-8.
■" Statement Issued by the NAC Meeting in Ministerial Session. Copenhagen, (June 6-7, 1991) in 
NATO Communiques, Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1991, pp. 22-23.
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their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and 
material concern of the Alliance/^ This perception of European security, have further 
strengthened the western orientation of CEEC.
The abortive Soviet coup of August 1991 led for example to the CEE states’ call for 
“institutionalised cooperation” with NATO. Until August, NATO treated all former 
WP countries alike. During the August 1991 coup attempt in the then-SU, the 21 
August 1991 North Atlantic Council (NAC) ministerial statement differentiated the 
SU from the other WP countries, when it suspended liaison “pending a clarification in 
the country.”’*^ At the emergency meeting of the NAC following the coup attempt in 
Moscow, it was reiterated once more that the security of the NATO member states 
cannot be seen as separate from the security of all other European states, the new 
democracies in particular.^*“* This led to a demand for a more explicit guarantee from 
NATO.“*^ This the NATO members were not prepared to give. As a result the CEEC’s 
began to look towards achieving NATO membership as a means of providing for the 
preservation of their national security.
Although the failed coup led to the rapid dissolution of the SU and the end of any 
remaining East European fears of an East-West confrontation the quest for NATO 
membership continued. The three Visegrad members subsequently met in October 
1991 at Cracow where they set their principal task as “a full-range integration into the
Ibid., p. 23.
NAC Statement. (21 August, 1991), in NATO Communiques ¡991, pp. 24-25.
Ibid., p. 25.
Rosser Balwin, “Addressing the Security Concerns of Central Europe Through NATO,” European 
Security. Vol. 2, No. 4, (Winter 1993), p. 546.
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European political, economic and juridical as well as security system.”'*^ Consequently 
they sought association with all the West European institutional bodies involved in 
security (NATO, WEU and EU) as well as strengthening of the CSCE process of
which they were already a part.47
1.2.2. From Friendship to Cooperation
The friendship among NATO and CEEC gave way to the cooperation in the political 
and military fields. And this cooperation stage was strengthened with establishment of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), as a framework where NATO and 
CEEC meet and consult with each other on the European security matters.
I.2.2.I. The Rome Summit
The most important summit of the Alliance in post-Cold War era, was that of Rome 
of November 1991, which marked a watershed in the history of NATO. At that 
Summit NATO leaders accelerated the process of the Alliance's transformation and 
redefined its role and missions in the new Europe, and raised the relationship with 
CEEC to a new level.'** The new level was marked with the establishment of the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which institutionalised the cooperation 
among CEEC and NATO. NATO also made commitment to Military Committee and 
subordinate committees to meet with representatives from CEEC at regular intervals. 
An annual NACC Work Plan was prepared and agreed, laying out topics for dialogue
The Cracow Declaration, reprinted in European Security. Vol. 1, No. 1, (Spring 1992), pp. 104-8. 
Dorman and Treacher, p. 99.
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and cooperation and specific activities by which the objectives of the programme
could best be met.49
I.2.2.2. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council
The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 
established a framework for dialogue and cooperation with the CEECs. The creation 
of the NACC was the culmination of a number of earlier steps taken by the members 
of the Alliance in the light of the fundamental changes which were taking place in 
CEEC. On 20 December 1991, on the same day that the events in Moscow marked 
the end of the SU, the NACC had its inaugural meeting. At this meeting, NACC 
states agreed that the confrontation and division of the past decades had been 
replaced by a new era of European relations characterised by dialogue, partnership, 
and cooperation aimed at securing a lasting peace.
The activities undertaken in the framework of NACC were the following:
i. The creation and subsequent work of the NACC Ad Hoc Group on 
Cooperation in Peacekeeping;
ii. Substantial and successful cooperation on scientific and environmental 
programmes;
iii. Significant contributions to implementing the verification provisions of 
the CFE Treaty;
Wörner, p. 8.
■*’ Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. Rome 1991. Klaus Naumann, “From Cooperation to 
Interoperability,” NATO Review. Vol. 44, No. 4, (July 1996), pp. 17-20.
22
iv. Cooperation on economic issues;
V. Contribution to stimulating informed public debate on security matters 
through the information programme.^®
The concluding meeting of the NACC took place in Sintra, Portugal on 30 May 1997, 
followed by the inaugural meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), 
which replaced NACC. By 1997, there were 40 NACC members, including all 19
NATO member countries.51
1.2.3. The Partnership
The establishment of the NACC as a cooperation framework, became an important 
consultative forum for NACC members. But the war in former Yugoslavia and the 
Russian aspirations to revive the former SU on the one hand, and NATO’s eagerness 
to enlarge towards CEEC, led these countries to request a new security framework 
which will replace the NACC. From CEEC’s perspective NACC did little to change 
their uncertain position.^“ Thus they started to seek full membership of NATO.
In 1993, the Visegrad states of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, were 
given encouragement that NATO enlargement might be eventually realised. In August 
1993 President Yeltsin visited Warsaw and issued a joint statement with President
Robert Weaver, “NACC’s Five Years of Strengthening Cooperation”, NATO Review. Vol. 45, No. 
3, (May-June 1997), pp. 24-6.
Member Countries of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC): The 19 member countries of 
NATO, plus: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
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Walesa of Poland that seemed to end Russian objections to Poland’s bid to join 
NATO. The statement declared, “in the long term, such a decision taken by a 
sovereign Poland in the interests of overall European integration does not go against 
the interests of other states including Russia.” On 26 August 1993, Yeltsin, then in 
Prague, responded to a question concerning Czech membership of the EU and NATO 
with the view that ‘Russia does not have the right to prevent a sovereign state from 
joining a European organisation’.^  ^ Walesa followed Yeltsin’s visit with letters to 
NATO leaders restating Poland’s reasons for seeking Alliance membership.
However the stance of Russia changed a month later. On 15 September 1993 Yeltsin 
sent a private letter to the leadership of the US, UK, France and Germany expressing 
opposition to the eastward expansion of NATO.^  ^ The Russian President proposed 
instead a joint Russian-NATO guarantee of the security of CEE. Russian opposition 
to NATO enlargement was at the same time made more explicit. In London on 27 
October 1997 Kozyrev announced that Russia was determined to prevent the 
admission of former WP allies to NATO.^^
I.2.3.I. The Travemuende Meeting
NATO, in order to placate both the CEEC’s quest for membership and Russia’s 
opposition to enlargement, introduced the PfP proposal at a meeting of NATO
Carr and Ifantis, p. 135.
A. Reisch, “Central Europe’s Disappointments and Hopes”, RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 3, No. 
12, pp. 18-37.
Carr and Ifantis, p. 135.
”  Ibid.,pp. 139-40.
Independent. (7 December 1994).
24
Defence Ministers in Travemuende, Germany. The proposal offered greater military 
cooperation with NATO, but not membership, and was open to all states in the
NACC and CSCE.57
I.2.3.2. The Brussels Summit
At the Brussels Summit of 10-11 January 1994, the Alliance Heads of State and 
Government adopted the PfP proposal and issued the Invitation to the NACC and 
OSCE to join to the new program: Partnership for Peace. At that Summit NATO 
leaders declared that they would “expect and would welcome NATO expansion that 
would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, 
taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.” *^ 
The PfP was placed under the authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and 
Partners were invited to participate in political and military bodies at NATO 
Headquarters with regard to Partnership activities. NATO did not extend its security 
guarantee or membership to Partner states but agreed to “consult with any active 
participant in the PfP if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity.
political independence, or security.’,59
The PfP plan gave a new impetus to closer cooperation between NATO and non- 
NATO countries. It went beyond the NACC program. Active participation in PfP can 
pave the way for integration and future membership. Almost all CEEC applied for the
M. Mihalka, “Squaring the Circle; NATO’s Offer to the East”, REE/RL Research Report. Vol. 3, 
No. 12, pp. 1-9.
See Appendix A, p. 96.
See Appendix A, p. 96.
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PfP program and signed an agreement for intensive cooperation. In contrast to 
NACC, PfP was hailed as the cornerstone of a new security relationship between
NATO and the newly democratic states in the East.60
The PfP program extended NATO’s cooperation with CEE without providing a 
timetable for NATO membership. Walesa had warned that Poland might reject the 
Partnership if if did not lead to membership. On 4 January 1994 he accused the West 
of inertia and lacking vision.^* The then Polish Foreign Minister, Andrzej Olechowski, 
speaking for all four Visegrad states in December, said they may refuse to participate 
in the PfP if the path to NATO was not clear and they concluded it was just a second 
Yalta.^ ^
Despite some serious reservations, Poland and its Visegrad partners had signed the 
Partnership Framework Document by the end of February 1994. Subsequent 
signatories included other states of CEE. The key issue of membership had not been 
answered but redefined; in President Clinton’s words, “the question is no longer 
whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how.” Despite pressures 
from the Partnership countries, the criteria for membership of NATO implicit in the 
framework were not linked to a procedure for realisation. Whilst it is clear that 
democratic control of the military and the institutionalisation of democratic principles 
are key expectations of the West, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
Joseph Kruzel on 15 November 1994 explained, “we cannot give you a checklist that
^  Hugh de Santis, “Romancing NATO-PfP and East European Stability,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies. Vol. 17, No.. 4, (1994) p. 65.
Guardian. (5 January 1994).
A. Reisch, pp. 18-37.
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you can tick off, and when you have completed your last requirement you are
admitted. It is much more of a political process than that. ,63
Romania was the first ex-communist state to join the PfP in January 1994. Bulgaria 
accepted the Framework Document on 14 February and made clear it was seen as a 
first step to full membership. '^* Albania has also sought NATO membership and sees 
the PfP as a bridge to that end. Moldova and Slovenia have also signed the PfP 
Framework Document. K. Engelbrekt has concluded that “for the most part, the 
Balkan countries appear to have reached more or less the same conclusions as their 
Visegrad neighbours ... when assessing the PfP program, they regard it as a small but 
significant step forward”.C le a r ly  the Balkan states’ interest in cooperation with 
NATO is underlined by war and instability in the region.
Although the PfP appeared to be primarily the brainchild of the Secretary of Defence 
Les Aspin, the most detailed exposition of the concept came in a speech by Secretary 
of State Christopher at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in December 1993. 
Christopher emphasised that the alliance envisioned “defence cooperation developing 
in a broad range of fields.” The PfP would provide a means for NATO’s eastern 
neighbours to “develop a practical working relationship” with the alliance, and each 
state would determine what resources it was willing to commit to that relationship. 
Even at the outset, though, “the Allies should provide all participants with a pledge of 
consultation in the event of threats to their security.” The PfP was designed to be
John Borawski, “PfP and Beyond,” International Affairs. Vol. 71, No. 2, (1995), pp. 233-46.
^  Edward Mortimer, “Better Part of Valour,” Financial Times. (February 2, 1994), p. 10.
K. Engelbrekt, “Southeast European States Seek Equal Treatment”, RFE/RL Research Report. 
Vol. 3,No. 12,(1994), pp. 38-42.
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more than a paper relationship, Christopher stressed. “It will develop capabilities to 
meet contingencies, including crisis management, humanitarian missions and peace­
keeping. It will develop useful habits of cooperation. It will enable us to develop 
common military standards and procedures. Peace partners will train side-by-side with 
NATO members and take part in joint exercises.
Christopher’s remarks exhibited “on the one hand, on the other hand” characteristics 
throughout, reflecting the administration’s urgent wish to satisfy everyone. “We must 
help to fill the vacuum of insecurity and instability that has come with the demise of 
the Soviet empire,” he intoned. “We must build the structures and the patterns of 
cooperation that will help to ensure the success of democracy and free markets in the 
east.” Christopher made it clear that the PfP was the preparatory stage for the 
enlargement of NATO’s responsibilities and, in all probability, the roster of members. 
Although the new arrangement was “an important step in its own right,” it could also 
“be a key step toward NATO membership.
Warren Christopher, “Strengthening the Atlantic Alliance Through a PtP,” US Department of 
State Dispatch . (December 13, 1993), pp. 857-8.
Ibid., p. 858.
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CHAPTER II
THE STRUCTURE AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
2.1 The Aims of the Partnership for Peace
The aims of the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) are mentioned in the 
Framework Document of PfP, which describes the basic principles of PfP. They are:
i. Facilitation transparency in national defence planning and budgeting;
ii. Ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
iii. Developing cooperative military relations with NATO for the purposes of 
joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of 
partner countries to undertake peacekeeping, search and rescue, and 
humanitarian operations as well as others as may subsequently be agreed;
iv. Maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under 
the authority of the United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and
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V. Developing, over the long term, forces better able to operate with those of 
the Alliance.^*
2.2. The Partnership for Peace Procedures and Operation
A country wishing to join the PfP is first invited to sign a Framework Document. By 
signing the Framework Document, participating countries undertake a political 
commitment to the preservation of democratic societies and maintenance of the 
principles of international law; to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of 
the UN and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; to refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes by 
peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all 
subsequent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) / OSCE 
documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have 
undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control. After signing the Framework 
Document, each Partner is required to submit Presentation Document to NATO. This 
document, indicates the aims for the cooperation of the Partner concerned with 
NATO, the specific areas of cooperation the Partner wishes to pursue jointly with 
NATO, and the military and other assets the Partner intends to make available for 
Partnership purposes.
68 S ee  A ppendix  B, p. 98.
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Based on the statements made in the Presentation Document, and on 
additional proposals made by NATO and the Partner, an Individual 
Partnership Programme (IPP) is developed and agreed jointly covering a 
three-year period. The IPP contains statements of the political aims of the 
Partner in PfP, the military and other assets made available by the Partner for 
PfP purposes, the broad objectives of cooperation between the Partner and 
the Alliance in various areas of cooperation, and specific cooperation activities 
to be implemented for each one of the cooperation areas included in the IPP. 
The selection of specific activities is made by each Partner separately on the 
basis of its individual requirements and priorities, in the context of the principle 
of self differentiation, from a list of such activities contained in the Partnership 
Work Programme (PWP).®’
The PWP contains a broad description of the various possible areas of cooperation 
and a list of available activities for each one of the areas of cooperation. The PWP, 
which covers a three-year period and is reviewed every year, is prepared with the full 
involvement of Partners.
2.3. Areas of Cooperation
Topics and activities undertaken in the PfP are included in the PfP PWP. Below are 
listed the generic agreed areas of cooperation that are updated every two years: Air 
Defence related matters; Airspace Management/Control ; Consultation, Command
Gebhardt Von Moltke, “Building a Partnership for Peace,” NATO Review. Vol. 42, No. 3, (June 
1994), pp. 3-7.
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and Control, including Communications and Information Systems, Navigation and 
Identification Systems, Interoperability Aspects, Procedures and Terminology; Civil 
Emergency Planning; Crisis Management; Democratic Control of Forces and Defence 
Structures; Defence Planning and Budgeting; Defence Policy and Strategy; Planning, 
Organisation and Management of National Defence Procurement Programmes and 
International Cooperation in the Armaments Field; Planning, Organisation and 
Management of National Defence Research and Technology; Exercises and Related 
Training Activities; Consumer Logistics; Medical Services; Military Infrastructure; 
Conceptual Planning and Operational Aspects of Peacekeeping; Operational, Materiel 
and Administrative Aspects of Standardisation; Language Training; Meteorological 
Support for NATO/Partner Forces; Military Exercises and Related Training 
Activities; Military Education, Training and Doctrine; Military Geography.™
2.4. Planning and Review Process
To facilitate cooperation activities, NATO and Partner countries endorsed a Planning 
and Review Process (PARP) within PfP based on a biennial planning cycle, beginning 
in January 1995, designed to advance interoperability and increase transparency and 
defence cooperation among Allies and Partners. At their meeting in December 1994, 
NATO Defence Ministers attached particular importance to this process as a means of 
serving two of the central purposes of PfP: closer cooperation and transparency in 
national defence planning and budgeting. They confirmed that PfP provides an 
effective mechanism to develop the essential military capabilities required to operate
70 EAPC Action Plan 1998-2000, Press Release (98)2, 14 January 1998.
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effectively with NATO and to encourage interoperability between NATO and 
Partners. Participation of PfP countries in PARP is voluntary. PARP plays a 
significant role in achieving many of the main aims of PfP. The participating nations 
identify specific forces to be provided for PfP and define their scope for improving 
interoperability. The first round of the PARP, which took place between January and 
May of 1995 with the participation of 14 Partner countries.
PARP is an integral part of PfP. In fact, its foundation was laid in the PfP Framework 
Document itself, which said: “...the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will 
develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a 
basis of identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available 
by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with 
Alliance forces...”” PARP holds out the promise of being perhaps the most effective 
vehicle available for securing greater interoperability in key areas of PfP and improved 
transparency in defence planning.
2.4,1. Interoperability
Interoperability is defined within NATO as "the ability of systems, units and 
forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or 
forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate 
effectively together."’  ^This definition has met NATO’s needs within the Alliance for 
many years but when the issue is with Partners from Central and Eastern Europe
S e e  A ppendix  B , p. 98.
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(CEE), particularly within the specific objectives of PfP, perhaps that definition needs 
to be qualified. The Major NATO Commanders, SACEUR (Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe) and SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic), have 
proposed that for Partners, interoperability with NATO should include: the training of 
personnel and units in NATO doctrine, procedures and practices which are capable of 
working effectively within NATO or NATO-led organisations on specific operations; 
adapting or procuring equipment which interfaces with that of NATO; selection and 
training of staff officers in NATO doctrine and procedures, so as to be able to fill staff 
appointments within NATO or NATO-led Headquarters or in national posts dealing 
with NATO/Partnership matters.”
One of the major objectives of PfP is for Partners to develop cooperative military 
relations with NATO for the purpose of planning, training and exercising in order to 
strengthen their ability to undertake missions in such fields as peacekeeping, search 
and rescue and humanitarian operations. A second major objective is for Partner 
nations to develop, over the longer term, forces which are better able to operate 
together with those of NATO nations. These two objectives are very closely linked to 
the goal of interoperability.
2.4.2. Defence Support
Since the launch of PfP in 1994, NATO's Defence Support committees have taken a 
series of steps to involve partner nations in their activities and those of their many
Anthony Cragg, “The PfP Planning and Review Process,” NATO Review. Vol. 43, No. 6, 
(November 1995), pp. 23-25.
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subordinate expert groups, thereby providing one of the more practical dimensions of 
PfP. Those activities, when combined with the new initiatives of enhanced PfP 
launched at Sintra in 1997, are designed to bring cooperation to a significantly higher 
level by involving partners progressively in the mainstream work of the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors (CNAD),^"  ^ the NATO Aii' Defence Committee 
(NADC),^^ the Committee for European Airspace Coordination (CEAC)^^ and 
the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3B)7^
Naumann, pp. 17-20.
The CNAD and its more than 100 subordinate groups (including those which deal with Research 
and Technology issues) focus on the planning, organisation and management of the cooperative 
development of defence equipment in the Alliance. Until the decisions taken at the meetings in 
Sintra, Portugal, and Madrid, Spain, last year, the CNAD's role in PfP was essentially guided by the 
Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs) and the overall Partnership Work Plan (PWP). However, 
even before the enhanced PfP was launched at Sintra in May 1997, consideration was being given to 
several initiatives which anticipated its aims and which would fulfil the objective of rendering PfP 
"more operational" and of associating partner nations much more closely to mainstream NATO 
business. In November 1996, CNAD opened one of its Main Groups — AC/313 on Acquisition 
Practices — and all five of its Cadre Groups (1) to the permanent participation of partner countries. 
These six groups, the first NATO bodies to incorporate partner participation on such a basis, have 
been accordingly labelled CNAD Partnership Groups. These bodies address technical issues 
which are essential to successful armaments cooperation and materiel standardisation, such as 
codification of spare parts, quality assurance and ammunition design and safety. The two principal 
features of partner participation in the CNAD's Partnership Groups are that partner nations are 
now able to associate themselves with decisions taken by the allies, as well as to participate in the 
development of future NATO technical standards affecting allies and partners alike, involving them 
in the truly substantive work of armaments cooperation in NATO. Naumann, pp. 17-20.
The NADC, in close cooperation with the NATO Military Authorities, is responsible for 
coordinating efforts to assure the adequacy and efficiency of the Alliance's air defence systems. The 
NADC's extensive and growing work with partners began in April 1994 when it held its first 
plenary cooperative session. Appreciating that "air sovereignty" is a high priority issue for partners, 
the NADC has organised a series of seminars and workshops addressing planning, operational and 
technical topics which are intended to improve understanding of air defence matters and increase 
transparency, trust and confidence among the participating nations through cooperation in air 
defence. Naumann, pp. 17-20.
The CEAC ensures the coordination of civil and military airspace requirements among the allies, 
as well as the improvement of air traffic management with partners. The CEAC first began 
cooperating with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1991, even before NATO 
established formal cooperation mechanisms with partner nations. Following the decision by Alliance 
Foreign Ministers in Oslo in June 1992, the CEAC invited partners to attend plenary sessions on a 
regular basis. Naumann, pp. 17-20.
The NC3B is responsible for the policy, planning and coordination of NATO's civil and military 
communications and information systems. The NC3B's PtP enhancement initiatives are critically 
important to achieving true interoperability between NATO and partner forces and they fall into 
three distinct categories: inclusion in projects and programmes, input to databases and participation 
in planning and decision making. Naumann, pp. 17-20.
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Partner involvement in this work facilitates interoperability between Alliance and 
partner forces, which is a key objective of PfP. Partners will be afforded the 
opportunity to contribute substantively to the activities of these four senior NATO 
committees, in ways which will have a lasting impact on the operational capability of 
partner forces to operate together with NATO forces within the framework of the 
Alliance's new missions. In this context, these defence support bodies, like all other 
senior NATO committees, now meet at plenary level with pai’tners at least once a 
year.
2.5. The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe: 
The Democratic Control of Military
The collapse of the autocratic and strongly centralist political and economic systems 
in the Eastern half of Europe has brought about in its wake important transformations 
of the Central and Eastern European Countries’ (CEECs) civil-military relations.^* 
Before the systemic transfomiation of CEEC, the system of political control over the 
armed forces of these countries, had oscillated between the dictatorial and oligarchic, 
between completely civilian controlled and only tenuously civilian dominated, between 
strongly externally controlled (with in fact a double subordination of the armed 
forces) and independent national systems.’^
Anton Bebler, “The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in CEE,’’ NATO Review. Vol. 42, No. 4, 
(August 1994), p. 28.
79 Ibid., p. 29.
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NATO member nations have tended to focus on only one element of this 
transformation - the establishment of democratic control over defence policy. The fact 
is that a national strategy for the transformation of the national defence establishments 
has to be just that a national strategy. No external agency, individual or institution can 
provide an answer. But as all Western countries have had to struggle with this 
problem over time, there is a value in Western specialists sharing their experience and 
analyses of the problem, as certain elements may nevertheless be applicable to the new
democracies.80
The PfP Framework Document rightly places democratic control of defence as a high 
priority and it has remained a focus in the activities of the PWP. It has also been the 
subject of several brainstorming sessions of the NATO Political-Military Steering 
Committee (PMSC), which is the main body of the PfP programme. The PMSC first 
met with partners and experts from capitals to discuss this issue in September 1995. 
Allied and partner representatives agreed that there are no universally accepted 
definitions or models of democratic control of defence. NATO itself cannot provide a 
model, simply because each ally follows its own unique cultural, political and military 
traditions. However, NATO in the framework of PfP, took a number of steps to 
establish and to strengthen the civilian control of defence forces in CEEC.
Both partners and allies agree that to enhance democratic control of defence is a common priority, 
for three main reasons. First, it is an essential element of democracy. Second, far from tying its 
hands, democratic control of defence is useful for the military. As demonstrated in many European 
countries and elsewhere in the world, a more transparent military is more efficient and effective than 
one which operates in social seclusion and above the law. Third, democratic control of defence 
provides the armed forces with indispensable legitimacy. In doing so, it earns them a greater degree 
of acceptance and respect by society at large, which they will need when seeking manpower 
(including conscripts) and national resources. For more information see, Marco Carnovale, “NATO 
Partners And Allies: Civil-Military Relation and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces,” NATO 
Review. Vol. 45, No. 2, (March 1997), pp. 32-33.
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With the support of NATO, there have been great changes in democratic control of 
defence forces in CEEC, which could be summarised as follows:
i. increased transparency of defence policies and often a greater supervisory 
role by parliaments and public opinion;
ii. civilianisation of defence ministries;
iii. radical personnel changes in the upper echelons of the armed forces;
iv. national emancipation, new security and defence doctrines;
V. partial redeployment and an altered profile for the armed forces;
vi. a greater stress on a participatory managerial style within military 
establishments, humanising some aspects of the way they function but 
combining this with stronger "institutionalism"; and
vii. relative political neutralisation of the armed forces, discontinuation of the 
military’s internal security role, disbanding separate military formations for 
internal security, and in some states abolishing separate military courts.^’
The new post-Cold War tasks of NATO - crisis management and peacekeeping - 
make democratic control of defence even more im portan t.T oo  frequently, the 
expression “political control” is interpreted as control by civil servants on behalf of 
the executive. However, to be truly democratic, political control must involve a 
substantial parliamentary role. What sort of role and how intrusive varies from 
parliament to parliament. Broadly speaking, parliamentary tasks can be divided into
32
Ibid., pp. 30-2. 
Ibid., pp. 34-5.
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four categories: accountability, influence, transparency and as a link to society at
large.83
Democratic political control of the armed forces is therefore more than the 
institution of laws and practices, it is a process of which parliamentarians 
form an integral part. PfP and its many activities will create at the 
governmental level the necessary conditions for convergence in this crucial
area.84
2.6. Military Exercises in the Framework of Partnership Programme
One of the main focuses of PfP is the development of greater cooperation in the field 
of peacekeeping. NATO and partner countries are increasingly likely to find 
themselves side-by-side in responding to, and implementing, UN and CSCE 
mandates. The need for more coherent preparation for peacekeeping missions has 
grown more urgent as a result of the increased risks and greater demands for military 
forces for such operations as those in former Yugoslavia. Field exercises, to promote
Parliamentarians also have the task of explaining to their publics the need for defence and defence 
expenditure and of creating the public understanding and support for the armed forces. In accepting 
the primacy of politicians, the military have the right to assume that the political side takes its 
responsibilities seriously. Interparliamentary organisations form an important part of this supportive 
infrastructure. As NATO's interparliamentary arm, the North Atlantic Assembly has long played a 
significant role in assisting legislators to become more effective in their national parliaments in 
influencing national defence policy. The NAA has been a transatlantic forum for parliamentary 
dialogue and a source of education, information and experience. From 1989, this role has been 
expanded to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This has been supplemented by a 
programme of special seminars on issues of particular topical or regional interest and by a training 
programme for parliamentary staff. Charlie Rose, “Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A 
Parliamentary Role In PfP,” NATO Review, Vol. 42, No. 5, (October 1994), pp. 13-19.
Ibid.,pp. 18-9.
Moltke, pp. 3-7.
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doser peacekeeping cooperation and interoperability, is a major aspect of PfP.**^  
Partners have not only be fully involved in the planning, but they have also host an 
exercise on their territory.
Three PfP military exercises took place in 1994 and focused on basic peacekeeping 
skills. They were held in Poland, Norwegian territorial waters and on the territory of 
the Netherlands. Eight exercises were organised in 1995. Fourteen exercises were 
held in 1996 which were further enlarged in size and complexity. Twenty-four 
exercises were organised in 1997. In addition to these NATO/PfP exercises, there 
have been numerous workshops and training activities plus bilateral “in-the-spirit-of ’ 
Partnership exercises between a Partner state and a NATO member. The NATO 
School in Oberammergau, the Marshall Center in Garmisch, the North Atlantic 
Assembly, and the Atlantic Treaty Association also ran special educational courses, 
conferences and seminars based on Partnership issues and themes.
The first PfP training event. Cooperative Bridge 94, was a resounding success and an 
excellent starting point for future activities. Planned and executed in an remarkably 
short time, the peacekeeping exercise, conducted at the Polish Army’s Biedrusko 
Training Area, provided quality training on common tasks for over 650 soldiers from 
six NATO and seven partner countries. Organised into five multinational companies, 
each with five national platoons, the Cooperative Bridge troops did situational
QO
training on basic tasks such as observing, controlling, patrolling, and escorting.
** Richard Vincent, “The Brussels Summit: A Military Perspective”, NATO Review. Vol. 42, No. I, 
(February 1994), pp. 7-11.
File:///CI/PfP Countries/PfPUsa3.htm.
Joulwan, p. 5.
40
In 1995 the major exercise was Spessart ’95, a trinational exercise that took place at 
Hammelburg training area, near Wurzburg in Germany from 8-15 December, and 
involved a total of some 1,200 troops from Denmark, Poland and Germany. This was 
the first exercise to be held in the spirit of the PfP on German soil.’*^
In 1996, exercise Arctic-Sarex 96 was conducted near Khabarovsk in the far eastern 
region of Russia, from 16 to 20 September. The exercise, which aimed to improve 
emergency preparedness and response, was organised by the Russian Ministry of 
Defence and sponsored by NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Directorate.^®
Strong Resolve 98, which took place from 9 to 21 March 1998, was the first major 
exercise in which multiple crises within the spectrum of NATO missions were staged 
in simultaneously separate geographical regions.Involving 50,000 soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, marines and civilians from 25 countries, this was the first large scale NATO
The aim of the exercise was to improve cooperation between the participating forces, exchange 
experience on multinational peacekeeping missions and develop procedures for joint crisis 
management operations. The participants were from the Prinsens Livregiment in Viborg, Denmark, 
the Tadejsza Kosciuszki Officer School in Wroclaw, Poland, and Paratroop Battalion 314 in 
Oldenburg, Lower Saxony, Germany. Under the command of a tri-national battalion HQ and with 
overall control of the exercise vested in Germany, the participants received instruction in what to do 
when employed at control and observation points, when they encounter explosives and mines, when 
on patrol duty or when escorting convoys and how to provide general protection for themselves and 
their colleagues. Reuters News Service. (23 December 1995).
The objectives of the exercise were to: test the international mechanisms of emergency notification 
and response in the case of an air crash and the practical cooperation of air search and rescue forces 
of the Russian Federation, Canada and the United States; and share experience in search and rescue 
and between medical teams from Russia, Canada and the US in the field of rescue activities in 
remote and difficult to reach places. Participating units included the Russian Ministry of Defence 
(the Russian Federal Agency for Air and Space Search and Rescue), the Ministry of the Russian 
Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters 
(EMERCOM), and Air Search and Rescue of Canada, and the United States Department of Defence. 
Reuters News Service, (22 September 1996).
NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Summer 1998), p. 11. Financial Times. (May 16, 1994), p.3. 
RFE/RL Daily Report. No. 173, (September 12, 1994), p.4.
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exercise jointly planned and executed by the two major NATO commanders,
S ACLANT and S ACEUR.92
2.7. Crisis Management
The other focus of the PfP is cooperation in crisis management, which is perceived 
that crisis management capabilities and cooperation is an important way to help to 
deal with the challenges of the new security environment. To develop cooperation and 
increase capabilities in crisis management, allies and partners developed a variety of 
activities, including: crisis management exercises with partners, associating partners 
with NATO crisis management exercises (such as CMX 98), meetings of the Council 
Operations and Exercise Committee (COEC) with partners, expert team visits to 
partner countries, briefings at NATO Headquarters, visits to the NATO Situation 
Centre and support for partner-organised crisis management exercises and seminars.
It is also important to note that a wide range of other PfP activities, particularly in the
Strong Resolve 98 comprised two main scenarios: Crisis North, conducted in Norway, was an 
Article 5 collective defence exercise; and Crisis South, which was a peace support operation 
conducted in the South-Eastern Atlantic, Western Mediterranean and Portugal and Spain. Strong 
Resolve 98, inter alia, allowed NATO to further develop and evaluate the Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) concept, NATO's new approach for planning and conducting peace support tasks with 
possible collective defence applications. The exercise also helped promote interoperability between 
NATO and its partners through participation of Partnership for Peace (PtP) partner nations in Crisis 
South. Among participating partner nations were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Sweden. They were involved in every aspect of Crisis South, with forces on land, at sea and in the 
air. File:///CI/PfP Countries/PfPUSA3.htm.
NATO has also sought to enhance crisis management cooperation and capabilities by providing 
partners with a set of generic crisis management documents including: the Generic Crisis 
Management Handbook, the Generic Inventory of Preventive Measures, the Generic Catalogue of 
Military Response Options and the Generic Manual of Precautionary Measures. John Kriendler, “PfP 
Crisis Management Activities: Enhancing Capabilities and Cooperation,” NATO Review, Vol. 46, 
No. 3, (Autumn 1998), pp. 28-31.
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field of military cooperation and peacekeeping, contribute directly to the capacity for
crisis management.94
2.8. Organs and Bodies of the Partnership for Peace
2.8.1. Political-Military Steering Committee
The basic working body in the field of PfP is the Political-Military Steering 
Committee on PfP (PMSC) which may meet in various configurations either at 
Alliance level or as the Alliance with Partners. The main responsibilities of the PMSC 
include: advising the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with respect to PfP, being 
responsible for the overall coordination of the PWP; developing political-military 
guidelines for use by the NATO Military Authorities for the preparation of their PWP 
input on military exercises and activities; providing guidance for the preparation of the 
IPPs and for submitting them to NAC for approval; and developing and coordinating 
work in relation to the PARP. So that aims for the partnership can be met as 
effectively as possible, NATO has established a PMSC under the chairmanship of 
Deputy Secretary General.
The PMSC meets in various configurations as the Partnership develops. It meets at 
the 19 + 1 (the 19 NATO allies plus one of the partner countries. The meetings in this 
configuration occurs when one of the partners wishes to hold consultation with 
NATO on various matters, ranging from political to military matters) level to address
94 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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issues related to IPPs. It also meets with several partner countries, where specific 
activities are of interest to more than one of them.
2.8.2. Partnership Coordination Cell
The Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), is a key element of the PfP programme. 
Under the authority of the NAC, its role is to coordinate the efforts of Partners to 
make their military structures interoperable with NATO in the areas of peacekeeping, 
humanitarian, and search and rescue operations; and to coordinate joint initial 
planning of activities such as training and exercises.
Under-Deputy Secretary-General’s command, it is located at Mons in Belgium. The 
inaugural opening of the PCC was conducted by NATO's Deputy Secretary General, 
Sergio Balanzino, in April 1994, in a building within the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE) compound. The PCC organisational structure incorporates 
four principal elements; the permanent staff. Partner liaison teams, NATO liaison 
teams, and a SACLANT staff element. With the exception of Iceland, each NATO 
nation is represented in the PCC by a liaison officer, who provides the principal 
conduit of information flow between the NATO nations and the corporate body of the 
PCC. The NATO liaison teams are provided by the SHAPE National Military 
Representatives, and are fully informed of their nation's PfP activities, whether 
NATO-based or bilateral.^^
Gunner Lange, “The PCC: A New Player in the Development of Relations Between NATO and 
Partner Nations,” NATO Review. Vol. 43, No. 3, (May 1995), pp. 30-1.
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The Director and the Deputy Director of the PCC are appointed by NAC on the 
advice of the Military Committee. The Director reports regularly to the Council, as a 
rule through the Military Committee. Implementation of PfP military activities is the 
province of NATO and Partner nations, and the NATO and National Military 
Authorities. The PCC coordinates implementation but has no authority for 
implementation in its own right. It is essentially dependant upon the positive 
participation and contributions of nations, the Major NATO Commanders, and other 
NATO agencies and authorities.
The PCC’s budget is internationally funded by all 19 NATO nations. The PCC is an 
organisation which is indeed developing quickly. Under the direct auspices of the 
NAC, it is already achieving a great deal in liaison between NATO and Partner 
n a tio n s .In  the PCC at Mons, there are 43 flags -one for each Partner and NATO 
country. They are arranged alphabetically - from Albania to Uzbekistan - not NATO 
nations on one side and Partners on another.’*
The Cell carries out a variety of tasks, including; Military planning necessary to implement the 
Partnership programmes; Dealing with Partner nations Individual Partnership Programmes, 
which outline a particular nation's requirements to meet the Partnership objectives - at a pace and 
scope determined by the individual Partners; Initiating coordination of contributions and requests 
together in a sound, cost-effective manner; Coordinating, monitoring and reporting on the results of 
training activities and exercises or of other military activities agreed under the Partnership Work 
Programme; Analysing and evaluating PfP training and exercise activities as well as contributing to 
the development of a PfP Work Programme, and the PtP force planning and review process. Lange, 
p. 32.
”  Ibid., p. 33.
Joulwan, pp. 5-6. Sergio Balanzino, “A Year After Sintra: Achieving Cooperative Security 
Through the EAPC and PfP,” NATO Review. Vol.46, No.3, (Autumn 1998), pp. 4-8.
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In 1993 the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) adopted a Work Plan with 
specific provisions on peacekeeping and created a NACC Ad Hoc Group on 
Cooperation in Peacekeeping.The Ad Hoc group was created within the framework 
of the NACC. When the PfP was established, it merged with the Political-Military 
Steering Committee (PMSC) into a joint NACC/PfP body called the PMSC/AHG on 
Cooperation in Peacekeeping.
PMSC/AHG serves as the main forum for consultations on political and conceptual 
issues related to peacekeeping, and for the exchange of experience and the discussion 
of practical measures for cooperation. The PMSC/AHG reports periodically to 
meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers on these matters. All meetings of 
PMSC/AHG include Partners. Ireland, as an interested member of the OSCE member 
state with specific experience in peacekeeping, also participates in the work of the 
group and actively contributes to it. A representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office 
regularly attends the meetings of the Group and, occasionally, a representative of UN 
also participatesw ith  Cooperation partners.
2.8.3. Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping
Simon, pp. 49-50.
NATO Communique issued by the NAC in Ministerial Session. NATO Press Communique M- 
NAC-K93) 38, (June 10, 1993), pp. 2-3.
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In mid-1997 the Alliance, taking into consideration the military, security and political 
succès of PfP in CEEC, decided to further enhance the role of the Partnership. There 
was need for a partnership with a better focused operational role that would prepare 
NATO and Partner countries to act together in future crises. In short, NATO wanted 
to forge a new relationship with partners which would engage them fully at the 
military level, but equally would give them a much greater say in the direction of the 
partnership. In Spring 1997 in Sintra, Portugal, Allied Foreign and Defence Ministers 
launched a wide range of enhancement measures which have added a new quality to 
PfP and have strengthened PfP in the political, security, and military fields.
The overarching objectives of PfP enhancement are:
i. strengthening the political consultation element in PfP;
ii. developing a more operational role for PfP;
iii. providing for greater involvement of Partners in PfP decision-making 
and planning.“^ '
2.9.1. Strengthened Political Consultations and Decision-Making
Decisions made in the context of decision-making offer a spectrum of opportunities 
for Partners to associate themselves with the PfP decision making process in the
2.9. The Enhanced Partnership for Peace
.Sergio Balanzino, “Deepening Partnership; The Key to Long -Term Stability in Europe,” NATO 
Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, (July-August 1997), p. 14.
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Political· Military Steering Committee (PMSC) on PIP and other relevant bodies, 
ranging from simple exchanges of views to full involvement in the consensus process 
leading to decisions.
The enhancements in this respect include:
i. Increased involvement of Partners in the political guidance and oversight of 
future NATO-led PfP operations in which they wish to participate;
ii. the development of a new political-military framework for PfP 
operations;'”^  and
iii. the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a new 
cooperative mechanism replacing the former NACC.
2.9.2, Enhancing the Operational Role of the Partnership for Peace
Numerous enhaneements have also been agreed in order to make PfP more 
operational. The most significant of these are:
i. Participation of Partner nations that .so wish, together with NATO Allies, in 
future PfP operations to be agreed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC);
ii. The involvement of Partners in the planning and conduct of PfP activities, 
including NATO/PfP exercises and other PfP operations, through the 
establishment of PfP Staff Elements (PSEs) at different NATO 
Headquarters;
102 Ibid., p. 14.
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iii. The possible participation of PSEs in Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
exercise planning, concept and doctrine development, and operations. The 
possible involvement of national personnel from Partner countries in CJTF 
headquarters. The enhancement of arrangements for national liaison 
representatives from Partner Countries at NATO Headquarters as part of 
the establishment of full diplomatic missions formerly accredited to NATO 
under the terms of the Brussels Agreement;
iv. Expansion of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) modelled on the 
NATO defence planning system and including the development of 
Ministerial Guidance and of Partnership Goals, replacing the 
Interoperability Objectives which form part of the former PfP process;
V. Increased scope for regional cooperation activities in the context of the 
Partnership, including consultations on both regional security matters and
on practical cooperation. 103
The desire to enhance the Partnership for Peace led to the creation of the 
Senior Level Group (SLG). Established in September 1996, the SLG developed the 
elements of an enhanced Partnership. Its recommendations were then developed 
further by the PMSC, the Senior NATO Committees and the NATO Military 
Authorities. Partners were directly involved at every stage of this process, playing an 
unprecedented role in shaping the recommendations of the SLG.
103 I bi d . , p .  15.
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With the enhanced PiP, tlie military missions of PfP have been expanded to embrace 
the full range of the Alliance's new missions, in particular peace support operations. 
The enhanced PfP has been welded to the new NATO which means that the 
partnership will evolve in step with the transformation of the Alliance itself. Also with 
the enhanced PfP, the Alliance has taken the significant step of extending the scope of 
(he NATO Security Investment Programme, so that it can now also include 
partnership projects. The major NATO Commanders have been tasked to develop 
proposals, together with partners, for projects that meet the operational requirements 
of PfP.'”' This is the commitment of the allies to increa.se the interoperability between 
NATO and CEEC.
2.9.3. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) forms the overarching framework for 
an expanded political dimension of partnership as well as practical cooperation under 
the PfP. As stated in the EAPC Basic Document, agreed on 30 May 1997, the EAPC 
will take full acount of and complement the respective activities of the OSCE and 
other relevant institutions such as the European Union (EU), the Western European 
Union (WEU) and the Council of Europe (CE).'"'^
The EAPC provides for the inclusion of all partners - former NACC members and PfP 
participating countries are automatically offered membership of EAPC and can join if
10-1 Ibid., pp. 15-6.
Basic Document oi the Euio-Allantic Partnership Council, Press Release, M-NACC-EAPC- 
1(97)66, (30 May 1997), pp. 4-6.
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they so desire."’'’ PfP in its enhanced form remains a clearly identifiable element of 
practical cooperation in defence-related and military fields within the flexible 
framework of the EAPC. As agreed in the Basic Document, the EAPC will meet, as 
required, in different formats:
i. In plenary .session to address political and .security-related issues of 
common concern and to provide information as appropriate on activities 
with limited participation;
ii. In a limited format between the Alliance and open-ended groups of 
Partners to focus on functional matters or, on an ad hoc basis, on 
appropriate regional matters. In such ca.ses, the other EAPC members will 
be kept informed about the results;
iii. In a limited format between the Alliance and groups of Partners who 
participate with NATO in a peace support operation or in the PARP or in 
other ca,ses for which this format has been agreed. The other members of 
the EAPC will be informed as appropriate;
iv. In an individual format between the Alliance and one Partner. Meetings of 
the EAPC at Ambassadorial or higher levels are chaired by the Secretary 
General of the North Atlantic Alliance or his deputy. The representative of 
a member country acts as President d'Honneur for six months. The EAPC 
meets, as a general rule, at Ambassadorial level in Brussels on a monthly 
basis. The Council meets twice a year at both Foreign Ministers and 
Defence Ministers level; additional meetings can be envisaged as required.
Member Countries of Euro-Allanlic Partnership Council (EAPC); The 19 member countries of 
NATO, plus: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
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It may also meet at the level of Heads of State or Government, when 
appropriate.
The work of the EAPC is supported regularly by the Political Committee (PC) and the 
Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) in their configurations in the Alliance 
with all Partners, ie. the EAPC(PC) and the PMSC (EAPC/PfP) respectively. On an 
ad hoc basis an EAPC Senior Political Committee may address issues referred to it, as 
required. The EAPC will consider, based on evolving practical experience, whether 
this support could be improved by an EAPC Steering Committee (EAPC-SC) which 
would integrate the functions of the EAPC(PC) and the PMSC(EAPC/PfP). The 
EAPC(PC) and the PMSC(EAPC/PfP) meet at least once a month, or more frequently 
if required. The PMSC meets, as appropriate, in an Alliance with individual Partners 
or Alliance with groups of Partners (e.g. Planning and Review Process) 
configuration.'”*
2.9.4. Science for Peace Programme
On 31 July 1997 NATO announced the creation of the “Science for Peace” (SfP) 
programme, a cooperative initiative between NATO members and partner countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Central Asia. This programme promises to 
give a new dimension to cooperative activities by enabling partner scientists to engage 
in applied research and development projects jointly with NATO counterparts. The
Sweden, Switzerland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Basic Document of the Eur-Atlantic Partnership Council, pp. 8-11.
EAPC Action Plan 1998-2000. Pre.ss Release (98)2, (14 January 1998).
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objectives of the programme are to support applied science and technology projects 
relevant to industrial, enviionmental or security-related problems and to help partner 
scientists to increase contacts in NATO science community, while building a stronger 
science infrastructure in their home countries."’’
The programme is a logical successor to the “Science for Stability” programme which 
has, for the past years, sought to reinforce the scientific and industrial infrastructures 
of Greece, Portugal and Turkey. It is hoped that SfP will further contribute to 
strengthening the ties between the scientific communities of the Euro-Atlantic group 
of nations, thereby enhancing overall security in Europe.
2.9.5. The Washington Summit
NATO leaders who met in the Washington Summit on 23-25 April 1999 to mark the 
50"' anniversary, welcomed and took special note of the initiatives designed to make 
the Partnership more operational and ensure greater Partner involvement in 
appropriate decision-making and planning, as they had envisioned in their Madrid 
Declaration. These steps will ensure that the Partnership will be better able to address 
its objectives, and will provide a solid foundation for its continuing evolution as the
core of a cooperative security network between NATO and its Partners for the 21st
, 110 century.
Jean-Marie Cadiou, “Science for Peace: NATO’s New Cooperative Programme With Partners,” 
NATO Review, Vol. 45, No. 6, (Nov - Dec. 1997), pp. 30-33.
Speech by NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the 
level of Heads of State and Government, Washington, (23 April 1999).
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To further this goal, they have approved the following comprehensive package: 
approved a Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations, which will 
enhance Partners' roles in political guidance and oversight, planning, and command 
arrangements for such operations; endorsed the expanded and adapted PARP, which 
will further enhance interoperability of Partner forces declared available for PfP 
activities, and will allow for more focused and increased Partner contributions of 
valuable forces and capabilities for future NATO-led PfP operations; endorsed the 
outline Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP operations, which will 
provide for deeper military cooperation between the Alliance and Partners with the 
goal of improving the ability of Partner forces and capabilities to operate with the 
Alliance in NATO-led PfP operations and directed the Council in Permanent Session 
to pursue its further development; endorsed the outline programme on enhancing PfP 
training and education to optimise and harmonise NATO and national PfP activities in 
order to meet the current and future demands of an enhanced and more operational 
PfP. The outline programme includes the role of three new PfP tools - a PIP 
Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, a PfP Exercise 
Simulation Network and PfP Training Centres. They directed the Council in 
Permanent Session to develop a PfP Training and Education Enhancement 
Programme.'"
I l l The Washington Summit, http://www.nato.int.
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CHAPTER III
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
In this chapter we will try to describe some of the PfP members’ perspective on the 
programme. The countries chosen are Russia, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic. 
Why the countries Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic are chosen, is due to the fact 
that they have been the ones which demonstrated the most progressive development 
with the programme of PfP. Their commitment to political and military 
transformation, is another reason for their selection. The Russian Federation has been 
chosen, with a view that she holds the most sceptical attitudes to the programme. In 
the chapter, the perspectives of the Baltic and Balkan members of PfP are also 
described due to the fact some of these states are considered as most active members 
of the PfP and they are viewed as the first countries to join the Alliance in the second 
wave of enlargement.
3.1. The Russian Perspective
When PfP proposal was adopted in January 1994, one of the major debates in Russia 
was focused on a question: should Russia join the PfP? Four main schools of thought
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appeared at this debate. The first - represented by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, 
top Foreign Affairs officials and a narrow circle of experts - argued that PfP was a 
Russian foreign policy achievement. It underlined that if Moscow refused to join PfP 
that Russia would find itself isolated even inside the Common Wealth of Independent 
States (CIS), with no opportunities to influence PfP’s future development. Therefore, 
this group called for joining the PfP and placed high hopes on interaction with NATO. 
Such cooperation could prevent NATO enlargement or at least postpone it well into 
the future. The second-school - the adversaries of A. Kozyrev in the parliament, the 
Security Council, and the Presidential Council - considered PfP an example of 
NATO’s attitude of dictating relations with Russia. It argued that PfP was designed to 
marginalise Russia and to take over its former sphere of influence in Europe, and to 
weaken Russia’s political and military ties with former Soviet Republics. This school 
argued against joining PfP. The third school’s main concern was that Russia in PfP 
would be doomed to be just one of a number of NATO partners with no special 
status, no say over NATO’s decisions, and no freedom of manoeuvre. Despite these 
concerns, this group did not reject PfP. They preferred to stress the need of an “equal 
partnership’’ with NATO. The fourth group welcomed PfP as a temporary 
compromise. It considered the adherence to PfP as the first practical step towards 
Russia’s deeper interaction with the Alliance. At the same time, this school called for 
NATO to grant Russia special status or conclude a strategic agreement which would 
guarantee Moscow permanent participation in the activities of the Alliance without
turning Russia into a member-state. 112
112 Carr and IfaiUis, pp. 145-6.
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The Foreign Ministry noted that NATO’s delay of enlargement and the adoption of 
PIP weic results of its efforts. However, the PIP did not generate any enthusiasm 
among the Russian political establishment. The second school, the group which 
opposed joining PfP, became dominant in the debate. As a result, the Foreign Ministry 
was forced to change its stance on PIP.
Russian Foreign Ministry decided to couple Russia’s signing of PIP with a specific 
arrangement that would single out Russia and give it a “special status”. The Russian 
response to the PfP was essentially a continuation of its policy towards the question 
of NATO enlargement. Russia sought NATO recognition of its importance as a great 
power, a nuclear power and the leading state of the former SU. Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev and Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev tried to attain a special position in 
the PfP and not the status of an ordinary member. On 6 April 1994 Yeltsin announced 
that Russia was seeking a “special agreement” with NATO. The Alliance was not 
willing however to grant Moscow separate status in the PfP. Russian acceptance of 
the PfP was affected by NATO action in Bosnia. The Alliance’s ultimatum of 
February 1994 concerning Sarajevo, followed by the April air strikes against Serb 
forces attacking Gorajde, led to a strong Russian reaction. Yeltsin demanded that 
Clinton consult Moscow before taking action in Bosnia. Kozyrev cancelled his 
intended visit to Brussels on 21 April 1994 to sign the PfP. When Russia finally signed 
the PfP Framework Document on 22 June 1994, no special privileges were secured."^
"Ibid., p. 147.
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On 1 December 1994 Kozyrev failed to sign the Individual Partnership Program (IPP) 
between Russia and NATO. The Foreign Minister took exception to a communique 
issued by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on prospective Alliance enlargement. The 
Russian Foreign Minister, Kozyrev, finally approved the NATO-Russian IPP on 3 
May 1995."''
In contrast to initial hopes, the PfP agreement between Russia and the NATO has 
never turned into a really full-.scale programme of security cooperation, joint-defence 
planning and training, mutual adjustment of military equipment, and the formulation of 
common doctrines and command structures for peace-keeping operations. Alexei 
Arbatov, the Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee of the State Duma, states that 
PfP has only been an instrument for security cooperation between Eastern and 
Western Europe since the Cold War, and an instrument of this type can only be 
effective if the goals and methods of its employment seem sensible, clear, and 
consistent to both parties. In post-Cold War, this requires not only an agreement on 
general goals, but also an equitable and respectful elaboration of common positions in 
specific cases of conflict resolution, the moulding of similar attitudes in domestic 
public opinions, and non-discriminatory decision-making structures for force 
employment.'"'
Writing in Foreign Affairs, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev gives the PfP at best a 
backhanded endorsement, saying that it answers the need to define Russia’s 
relationship with the alliance for now.” His coolness toward the alliance is evident
NATO Defence College (ed.), Cooperative Security Arrangements in Europe, Vol. 5, New York, 
Peter Lang, 1997, p. 75.
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when he cautions that the program must not “stimulate NATO-centrism among the 
alliance’s policy-makers or NATO-mania among impatient candidates for 
membership.”"*’
President Boris Yeltsin on 24 March 1999 suspended Russian cooperation with the 
NATO Alliance in response to its air strikes against Yugoslavia. In a statement 
released shortly after the attacks began, Yeltsin said he had called for an emergency 
meeting of the UN vSecurity Council. Yeltsin, who had earlier made a last minute 
appeal to NATO to call off the attacks, recalled Russia’s repre.sentative at NATO 
headquarters in Brus.sels and halted cooperation with the Alliance under the PfP 
programme. Yeltsin also suspended talks on opening a NATO military mission in 
Mo.scow, saying the alliance was trying to assume a “world policemen” role which 
Mo.scow found totally unacceptable."’
3.2. The Polish Per.spective
Poland became a full member of NATO on 12 March 1999. Full membership was a 
consequence of Poland’s successful cooperation with NATO in the PfP programme. 
Participation in PfP activities, greatly helped Poland effectively integrate with NATO. 
Initially, Poland, viewed PfP with apprehension, but later it viewed it with enthusiasm 
for its integration with NATO. PfP’s one weakness, according to Polish view, was 
that it prolonged the process of integration and contributed to Poland’s impatience
11.·! Ibid., pp. 75-6.
Andrei Kozyrev, “The Lagging Partnership”, Foreign Affairs. No. 73, (May-June 1994), p. 65. 
' Reuters News Service. 24 March 1999.
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because of the urgent need to modernise its forces."** On the positive side, Poland 
saw PfP participation as the only vehicle to NATO membership, an efficient means to 
promote regional stability, and permitting self-differentiation among PfP members.
Following as 10 January 1994 cabinet session, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzey 
Olechowski appraised PIP as “too small a step in the right direction,”’*^” and then 
President Walesa of Poland noted that NATO is committing a “serious error” in trying 
to satisfy the Russian Federation. He also warned that Poland might reject the PfP if it 
did not lead to m em bership.The programme did not fully correspond with the 
strategic aims of Polish security policy. Polish public opinion received the concept of 
“Partnership” with a good do.se of .scepticism.
However the complexity of interests involved in NATO enlargement led Poland to put 
aside its initial scepticism and, instead, decide to join PfP. Also the Polish perception 
that the revolutions of 1989 have marked a return to life in a “gray area” between 
stable West and unstable East, and that the new situation brought back memories of 
the period before 1939 when Poland stood alone, between two powerful neighbours, 
Germany and Russia, was the strongest motivation for Poland’s willingness to 
participate to PfP, .seeing it as the only possible way to NATO.'^^
Andrzej Karko.szka, “A View From Poland,” in NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options, 
edited by Jeffrey Simon, NDU, Wa.shington, DC, 1995, pp. 75-6.
Ibid., p. 78.
Jeffrey Simon, “The PIP Path and Civil-Military Relations,” in NATO Enlargement: Opinions 
and Options, edited by Jeffrey Simon, p. 5.3.
Guardian, (5 January 1994).
http://www.msz.gov.pl/english/indexang.html.
For more information on Poland’s seeurity risks and ehallenges see, Genowefa Smagala, 
“Poland,” in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political Attitudes in 16 European 
Countries, edited by Harald Müller, Frankfurt, PRIF, European Interuniversity Press, 1998, pp. 231- 
241; Karkoszka, p. 78.
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Poland formally joined the PIP Programme on 2 February 1994, by signing the PfP 
Framework Document. On 25 April of that year, the Polish Presentation Document 
was submitted to NATO Headquarters. It contained, among others, Poland’s 
agreement to cooperate with NATO in pursuing the objectives formulated in the 
Framework Document. At the same time, Poland stressed in the Presentation 
Document that it treated the PfP as a mechanism leading to its future integration with 
NATO. It also presented its own priorities of cooperation in the PfP framework, 
considered to be of particular significance in the process of preparing for future 
integration with NATO. These included political consultations, military exercises with 
stress on peace-keeping operations, command and communication systems, defence 
planning, standardisation, defence infrastructure and military education and training.
The programme was implemented by Poland in three basic forms of cooperation: 
consultations by groups of experts, sharing of experiences and information; 
participation by civilian and military experts in courses and training sessions offered 
by the Alliance; and participation by military units and ob.servers in training sessions 
and exercises dealing with peace-keeping, humanitarian and search and rescue 
operations. In 1994 Poland took part in 40 Partnership activities, including all three 
field exercises. The first of those exercises, code-named "Cooperative Bridge", was 
held in Poland, on the Biedrusko training ground near Poznan. In 1995, 130 IPP 
activities were carried out. These included 9 exercises involving armed forces: 8 in 
Europe and one for the first time held in the U.S., under the aegis of Supreme Allied 
Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). The code name of the exercise was "Cooperative 
Nugget.” In 1996, the Polish IPP contained 242 activities. The number of military
6i
exercises involving representatives of the Polish Armed Forces increased to 21. In 
1997, Poland was engaged in about 450 different PfP activities, including in 25
military exercises. 124
vSuccessful cooperation aetivities undertaken in the PfP framework, made Poland to 
view PfP as the only ticket towards NATO membership. PfP Programme was in many 
respects a turning point in Poland’s cooperation with the Alliance. It made possible 
forging of Poland-NATO political relations with a dynamic development of military 
cooperation, thus greatly contributing to Poland’s efforts to prepare for integration 
with NATO. PfP provided political and moral support for Polish society, which has 
been undergoing painful reforms. It was seen as furnishing a kind of de facto 
guarantee to the success of these transformations.'^^ It also helped on a larger scale in 
the modernisation of Polish armed forces. PfP helped PfP to sign state-to-state 
treaties on friendly relations, recognition of borders, protection of ethnic minorities, as 
well as several agreements on cooperation in defence matters.
3.3. The Hungarian Perspective
Hungary was one of the most enthusiastic members of the PfP. Its basic foreign and 
security policy objective after the 1989 revolutions, has been integration with western 
organisations, particularly with NATO. It saw PfP as the only means to achieve its 
basic foreign and security policy objective.
Interview with Grzegorz Michalski, Embassy of the Republic of Poland, 23 February 1999, 
Ankara.
The New York Times. (13 March 1999).
Karkoszka, pp. 78-9.
62
Hungary was aware that membership in NATO was not possible immediately alter the 
great transformation, therefore sought to develop practical ties with NATO and to 
work actively within PfP. Tensions with Russian Federation, the security risks and 
challenges posed by the war in former Yugoslavia, and political, social and economic 
difficulties in the region, led Hungary to look increasingly to NATO for security 
guarantees.T hus Hungary moved forward with practical military cooperation with 
the West, developing bilateral military contacts and exchange programmes with
NATO states 12«
Hungary’s position was confirmed in February 1994 when it joined PfP, with Foreign 
Minister Jeszenszky stating that this was a first step to NATO membership. 
Hungary showed its commitment to PIP when it hosted NATO’s fourth largest 
exercise in the framework of PfP in October 1995, where some 2,000 troops from
“Call Гог New Security Guarantees,” RFE/RL Research Report, No. 1, (8 May 1992), p. 53.
Western allies, after witnessing the ineficcliveness of the UN peace-keeping forces in Bosnia, 
welcomed the US initiative to use NATO forces spearheaded by American troops for peace-keeping 
in Bosnia. This was referred to as the Implementation Force, or IFOR. That new development 
provided Hungary with an opportunity to prove the sincerity of their commitment to NATO, “not on 
paper but in practice,” as it was stipulated by the document that discussed the conditions for NATO 
membership. For logistic reasons, Hungary’s strategic location was noted early by NATO’s military 
planners. Hungary quickly signalled its readiness to support the planned operation in former 
Yugoslavia. NATO planners needed a support base outside of Bosnia. They had their eyes on Taszar, 
an abandoned Red Army base with an air field in south-western Hungary, near the city of Kaposvar. 
Eventually, Taszar was selected to serve as a logistic support base for NATO troops heading to 
Croatia and Bosnia. Concurrently with NATO’s request for the use of the Taszar air base. Foreign 
Minister Kovacs reported that NATO also requested the participation of a technical team of two 
hundred to three hundred Hungarian soldiers in the peace-keeping operation. The Hungarian 
government and parliament approved the stationing of IFOR troops in Hungary and authorised the 
sending of a five-hundred-vSoldier technical unit to Bosnia. A.A. Reisch, “Hungary pursues 
Integration with the West,” RFE/RL Research Report, No. 2, (26 March 1993), p. 34.
“Hungary, Ukraine, Sign the Partnership for Peace,” RFE/RL News Briefs, No. 3, (7-11 February 
1994), p. 15.
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seven European countries participated. The code name for the operation was
“Cooperative Light ‘95.”130
In Hungary’s view, PIP constituted the basic instrument of political cooperation 
between NATO and its former adversaries. Hungary understood that PfP’s 
implementation is an intermediate step towards Hungary’s full membership in the 
Alliance. PIP helped Hungary to gain time psychologically. Although the election of 
the socialist party in May 1994 rai.sed fears of a reorientation away from the West, the 
new government continued to seek membership of NATO and no major political 
forces within Hungary questioned the strategic objective of integration with the West, 
except Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party and a small group of NGO’s, such as Alba 
Kör, a non-violent peace movement founded in 1990.'^'
From the outset, Hungary welcomed the PfP initiative as a practical supplement to the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) process, tailoring cooperative activities 
to the needs and aspirations of individual partners. This individual approach was 
especially valuable for Hungary, which has to change its defence system. PfP gave 
Hungary a chance to adapt its forces to NATO tasks, structures and standards by 
undertaking cooperative activities in military planning, training and joint exercises. 
This helped Hungarian armed forces reach a high level of compatibility so it can join 
NATO troops in conducting peacekeepings humanitarian and rescue missions. 
According to President Gonez of Hungary, the PfP provided Hungary with an
Reuters News Service, 13 Seplcinbcr 1995.
Er7„sebel N. Rozsa, “Hungary,” in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political 
Attitudes in 16 European Countries, edited by Harald Müller, Frankfurt, PRIF, European 
Interuniversity Press, 1998, p. 217.
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opportunity to gradually adjust to the requirements of NATO. By 1994 Hungary had 
developed an increasingly close political and military relationship with NATO, 
establishing it as one of the primary Eastern candidates for membership. In a special 
report, the Horn government of Hungary expressed its satisfaction with Hungary’s 
participation in the PfP. “Living up to our expectations,” noted the report, “the more 
than one year concrete collaboration with NATO greatly advanced our adaptation to 
NATO-regulations ... and earned the NATO partners positive recognition for our 
participation in the Planning and Review Process (PARP).” The report hailed the 
decision to open a PfP language training center in Hungary to make up for the 
shortcomings in foreign language knowledge in the Hungarian m ilitary.H ungary’s 
commitment to NATO membership and NATO’s decision for enlargement towards 
East, led Hungary to become the full member of the Alliance on 12 March 1999.'”
3.4. The Czech Perspective
Czechoslovakia formally ceased to exist on 1 January 1993, with the Czech and 
Slovak Republics becoming independent states. The new independent Czech Republic 
has made integration with the West its central foreign and security policy objective.
Andrew Fclkay, Out of Russian Orbit: Hungary Gravitates to the We.st. London, Greenwood 
Press, 1997, pp. 90-99.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi, in the joining of Hungary to NATO ceremony held 
in Washington, said his country's historic decision to apply for NATO membership was taken not 
only to enhance security, but to bring Hungary back into the family of European nations. "The 
decision was not only about security. NATO accession is also about returning Hungary to her natural 
habitat. It has been our manifest destiny to rejoin those with whom we share the same values, 
interests and goals." Martonyi said the price of liberty for those three former communist countries 
was very dear. He reminded listeners that Hungarian aspirations for freedom were once crushed by 
Soviet tanks in 1956. For that reason, he said, NATO's three newest members know well the value of 
freedom. Martonyi said Hungary will respect all human rights and the right of freedom of expression 
for national minorities. He also said Hungary will support the aspirations of other CEECs that also
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Prime Minister Klaus sought to establish the Czech Republic on a “fast track” for 
integration with NATO and other Western institutions.
The Czechoslovak government very rapidly developed two core elements to its new 
post-Cold War security strategy; the strengthening of the Conference on Securty and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to create a pan-European collective security system 
and collaboration with Poland and Hungary in pursuing integration with the West.
Disappointment with the way in which the CSCE was developing as a security 
institution led to a significant re-think of national security policy. More significantly, 
recognition of the limitations of the CSCE appears to have convinced the 
Czechoslovak government that the expansion of ties with NATO should play a central 
role in Czechoslovakia’s security.'^"*
The Soviet military crack-down in Lithuania in January 1991 and the August 1991 
attempted coup in the SU intensified Czechoslovak fears and brought the tensions 
between Czechoslovakia and SU. During the coup a Foreign Ministry official stated 
that, “we hope that we would be under the wing of the NATO, especially during a 
crisis like this.” Foreign Minister Dienstbier said that Czechoslovakia would seek full 
membership of NATO if it felt threatened pending the establishment of a new 
European security system.''^'’
want to join (he alliance. Julie MolTelt, “NATO: Poland, Hungary, And The Czech Republic Become 
Full Members,” RFE/RL Continuing Coverage. (March 1999), p. 3-6.
Ibid., p. 68.
'·" Andrew Cottey, East Central Europe after the Cold War. London, New York, Macmillan Press, 
1995, p. 63.
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When PI? was pioposcd in October 1993 President Havel stated that the Czech 
Republic would continue to press for NATO membership, warning that PfP could not 
be regarded as an alternative to membership.'^*’ Despite concerns over PfP, the Czech 
Republic became one of its first signatories in March 1994, with Prime Minister Klaus 
describing NATO as “the most reliable way of safeguarding our security.”' ’  ^ On 
March 10, 1994 when Prime Minister Klaus signed the PIP general agreement making 
the Czech Republic the ll"' country to join the project. Defence Minister Baudys 
noted that the program “is the maximum possible and the minimum desired.” 
According to the results of the interviews conducted by Jiri Sedivy, the Czech public 
opinion has not been very enthusiastic on integration with NATO.'^* The problems of 
international security and its potential impacts on the country are marginal in public 
perception and debate.'·’*' Nevertheless, the Czech Republic demonstrated its 
commitment to PfP when it hosted “Olsina ‘95”, the peace-keeping exercise held in 
September 1995 and “Cooperative Challenge ‘95”, a multi-national peacekeeping 
exercise at brigade level held between 2 to 5 October.'“"’
The PIP Framework Document declared that “each subscribing state will develop with 
NATO an individual Partnership Programme.” This clause especially was welcomed in 
the Czech Republic as an indication of the possibility of a multi-speed, separate
“Czech OrUcial Commenls on NATO Announcement”, RFE/RL News Briefs. 2, (18-22 Oelober 
1993), p. 18.
“Czech Republic join.s Partnership for Peace,” RFE/RL News Briefs. 3 (7-11 March 1994), p. 19. 
.liri Sedivy, “The Czech Republic,” in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political 
Attitudes in 16 European Countries, edited by Harald Müller, Frankfurt, PRIF, European 
Interuniversily Press, 1998, pp. 243-4.
Jiri Sedivy, “Security in Central and Eastern Europe: Problems - Perceptions - Policies: Czech 
Republic,” Unpublished Paper, HR, Prague, January 1998, p. 5.
'''** Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 January 1996.
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approach to the Alliance. After the PfP was adopted, the Czech Foreign Minister 
Zieleniec said: “We are fully convinced this project opens for us the possibility of 
becoming a member of the Alliance.” Czechs came forward quickly with a concrete 
offer to sacrifice their balanced budget projected for 1994 by accepting a 1 percent 
deficit in order to finance the local cost of their participation in the programme.'“"
For Czech Republic, PIP is a means to help prepare her to be effective ally and to be 
producer and nit just the consumer of security. Czech Republic also views PfP as a 
programme that prevents the creation of gray zone, buffer state, or spheres of 
inf luence .A significant theme to which the Czech Republic pays clo.se attention is 
the process of building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within 
the Alliance and within the PfP. As a country aspiring to European Union (EU) 
membership, the Czech Republic .supports the creation of mechanisms enabling 
Europe to conduct operations in respon.se to regional crises. The Czech Republic is 
interested in full participation in the European discussion on .security matters, as well 
as in the implementation of the European security policy. It is also interested in 
strengthening the Partnership programme further. Miroslav Fortelka, the Czech 
Consular in Ankara, states that, “as a full member, we will take advantage of our 
experience with PfP activities and try to initiate further improvements and 
enhancement of the progr amme.”'“'^  The Czech Republic’s strategic goal was to join 
NATO and it became a member of the Alliance on 12 March 1999. They did not see 
PfP as a substitute for NATO member ship, but as a step towar d membership.
Jiri Sedivy, “Czech and NATO ReIalion.s: A Dynamic Process,” Unpublished Paper, Charles 
University, Prague, 1996, p. 10.
M2 Reuters News Service. 7 December 1995.
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The plural form the “the Baltics” entered into international political discourse more 
frequently at the close of the 1980s. The revolutionary changes of the late 1980s, 
made it possible for the Baltic countries to regain their independence and thus restore 
the primary conditions for their international action and interaction. Overall changes in 
the “power constellation” of world politics, explicitly suggested the emergence of a 
new security architecture in Europe. Subsequently, the three Baltic countries of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania found themselves provided with the realistic 
opportunity to be part of this new arrangement. The Baltic countries became among 
those states with strategic objectives for achieving full NATO membership. The PfP 
initiative of January 1994 effectively bound the Baltic countries to a coordinated 
action. The initiative received a joint response from the Baltic side in the form of a 
common statement issued by the three Baltic presidents on 11 January 1994 in 
support of PfP as a concrete means for working out cooperation between NATO and 
tlie Baltic countries. Shortly thereafter, the PfP Framework Document was signed by 
each of the countries: Lithuania on 27 January, Estonia on 2 February and Latvia on 
14 February 1994. The need to implement PfP tasks necessitated common Baltic 
military activities such as the joint air surveillance and monitoring system, a common 
mine-sweeper .squadron and the Baltic Battalion.''*'’ The creation of the latter in
3.5. The Baltic States’ Perspective
Interview with tlic Czech Consular Miroslav Kortelka in the Czech Embassy in Ankara, 12 April 
1999, Ankara.
" ' Marc Haab, “Potentials and Vulnerabilities of the Baltic .States,” in The Baltic States in World 
Politics, edited by Birthc Hansen and Bartel Heurlin, Curzon, 1998, p. 10-1.
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September 1994 has been the most tangible expression of Baltic unity in terms of a 
colleclive regional thinking and acting on international security measures.
The Baltic states clearly regard NATO as the only organisation that can provide them 
with a “hard” security guarantee. NATO officials point out that active participation in 
the PfP programme, for the time being, is the closest thing to a real “security 
guarantee” that the Balts can get. All Baltic states are trying to .substantiate their 
membership credentials by participating fully as possible within the PfP, trying to 
demonstrate that they are not only “consumers” of .security, but are, and will be, a 
valuable as.set for the Alliance as a whole. Baltic participation in the Bosnia IFOR, 
was therefore symbolically very important. The Baltic states also often participate in 
PIP military exercises. The Baltic Challenge ’96 exercises, held in Latvia in July 1996 
in the eontext of NATO’s PfP programme, have been important to train Baltie troops 
for future peacekeeping duties. The Baltic states also participated in the PfP exercise 
Baltic Circle ’96, which took place in Denmark in September-October 1996. All three 
Baltic states also participate in the PfP PARP, which is designed to advance 
interoperability and increa.se transparency among Allies and partner countries.'“'^  In 
the meantime, the lack of Financial resources continues to be a serious problem for the 
Baltic states in their efforts to upgrade their armed forces to a level adequate to fully 
participate in NATO’s PfP programme.
M?^ The Baltic Times, 20-26 June 1996.
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Of the Balkan states, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia, are the 
members of PfP. The post-Communist government of Albania committed itself to 
democratic reform and began immediately to orient itself towards Western 
institutions, including joining the NACC in 1992. Albania was one of the first 
countries to join PfP, in February 1994, stating that its ultimate strategic goal was 
membership of the Alliance.
An official request from the Defence Minister of Albania, Sabit Brokaj, for NATO 
support in rebuilding the armed forces was received on 1 August 1997. 
NATO had already been monitoring developments and was able to respond 
immediately, having previously decided to make use of PfP as the framework 
to provide the much-needed assistance should Albania make such a request.'“**’ A 
special forum for the coordination of their assistance activities, the Clearing House on 
Albania (CHA), was agreed by NATO and Albania. The PfP CHA is a well- 
established foium where allies meet twice a year to di.scuss their national cooperation 
programmes, in the context of PfP.''^ They exchange information on each other's
3.6.1’he Balkan States’ Perspective
Preliminary work slarlcd at once on a specially tailored assistance programme focused on the 
immediate requirements for rebuilding the Albanian armed forces. As a first step, the North Atlantic 
Council agreed to send an expert-level Fact-Finding Team (FFT) to Tirana, which arrived on 18 
August 1997. Its immediate objective was to identify the requirements for assistance and prioritise 
them on the basis of information received from the Albanian side. The findings of the FFT indicated 
the scope and urgency of the assistance required and NATO was quick in re.sponding with a 
programme of assistance that was the first of its kind. George Katsirdakis, “Albania: A Case Study 
In The Practical Implementation of PIP”, NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Summer 1998), pp. 22-24.
Ibid., p. 26.
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programmes, thus increasing transparency and enabling nations to better prioritise 
their cooperation activities vis-à-vis the programmes of other allied nations.
Since its very beginning, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) has 
established and directed its strategy, primarily, towards the Euro-Atlantic political and 
security structures wishing to fully join them, namely NATO as well as other 
international organisations. The active participation of the FYRM in all of these 
structures is a long term goal of the state and it sees its position as a full member in 
the new European political and security system. In accordance with the shared views 
in Brussels, the FYRM is one of the most active members of the PfP and actively 
contributes to the promotion of the Partnership goals. Within the PfP, the FYRM has 
established a good military cooperation with the countries in the region and primarily 
with its neighbours. The soldiers of the FYRM have participated in several NATO 
sponsored exercises together with the soldiers of NATO and PfP member countries. 
The FYRM believes that it has a lot to offer to the Alliance.'“"^
The Parliament (Sobranije) of the FYRM, on November 23, 1993 passed a decision 
for NATO full membership. Based upon the unified efforts, the FYRM was on of the 
first countries which welcomed the PfP initiative in January 1994 and expressed its 
determination to Join. In November 1995, the FYRM became a full member country 
of the PfT^ . Immediately after it joined the PfP, the FYRM has developed the 
Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) in the shortest time possible. The IPP was 
verified by the NACC and by the NATO Political Committee in March 1996. This
While Paper of the Defence of tlie Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Defence, Skopje, 
hltp://www.morin.gov.ink.
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crealed conditions for the FYRM to become an active participant in all of the joint 
activities of tlie PI? and NATO. Since July 1996, the FYRM had its own 
representatives in NATO - liaison officers in Brussels and at the PCC at Mons. Since 
January 1997, the FYRM has become a member of the Planning and Review Process 
(PARP), which increases the cooperation with the PfP and NATO member countries 
and by which the FYRM was included among the most serious candidates for NATO 
membership.''''^
In January 1994 Romania was the first ex-Soviet bloc member to join the PfP. It has 
been an enthusiastic participant in PfP programmes. Romania initially saw PfP as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for admission into the alliance. Later, Romania 
saw PfP as the perfect instrument for the required modernisation of its armed forces 
through increasing its armed forces’ contact with the developed NATO member 
countries. Third, Romania saw PfP as an important means to contribute to increased 
stability and security on the continent. Fourth, Romania saw PfP as an important 
means to improve relations with neighbours, given the significant and positive impact 
that military collaboration already had on the general bilateral relationship with 
Hungary. Romania has peacekeeping battalions in various PfP operations, including 
an engineers’ unit in the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.
Slovenia accepted the PfP offer by NATO and was the first non-NACC member to 
conclude a framework agreement on March 30, 1994. On the basis of the thus 
expressed decision of the Slovene Parliament, the Republic of Slovenia was among
Stalemcnt by Ihe President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, K. E. Gligorov, 
Meeting of the EAPC, Madrid, (9 July 1997), p. I.
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Ihe firsl stales to join PIP, on 30 March 1994. Later on, Slovenia also acceded to the 
PARP. Slovenia submitted its first Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) in 1995. 
In August of the same year, members of the Slovene Army participated for the first 
time in the PfP exerci.se, which took place in the USA (Cooperative Nugget). 
Slovenia became a full member of NACC at the end of January 1996. The political 
resolution of the Republic of Slovenia to join NATO was unequivocally expressed by 
a decision adopted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia stating that 
"the Republic of Slovenia wishes to safeguard its fundamental strategic security 
interest within the system of collective defence rendered possible by membership in
NATO.”150
Slovenia was among the first partner states which responded to the proposal of the 
Atlantic Alliance for individual dialogue with NATO, and the first partner state to 
start the dialogue on 17 April 1996. In three rounds of the individual dialogue, 
Slovenia fully presented its political, economic, and defence structure.
Ignac Golob, “Preparing for Membership: Slovenia’s Expanding Ties to NATO,” NATO Review, 
Vol. 44, No. 6, (Nov. 1996), pp. 24-5.
151 Ibid,, p. 26.
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CONCLUSION
Tliis work describes Ihe Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and its military and 
political effects on the Central and East European Countries (CEEC). NATO’s 
responses to developments in the CEEC have been extraordinary in that so many 
initiatives have been taken after the end of the East-West conflict, in order to meet the 
demands of CEEC and project the NATO’s interests to the region. The PfP has been 
one of the most important initiatives, which has been the culmination of steps prior to 
the enlargement of the Alliance.
The PfP (which is said to have originated in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe -SHAPE- headquarters in March-April 1993 as the “Partnership for 
Peacekeeping”) was first pre.sented to the NATO allies in October 1993. In the 
Brussels Summit of January 1994, NATO invited North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) members and also the other member countries of the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to join the PfP. This partnership was 
established within the framework of the NACC, now superseded by the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC). It is a practical programme going beyond a dialogue and 
cooperation, and aiiued to design to forge a partnership between the Alliance and 
participating states.
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Tlie PfP first met with criticism (e.g., Henry Kissinger described PfP as a “vague, 
multilateral entity, specialising in missions having nothing to do with realistic military 
tasks;” Alexander Honcharenko argued that PfP could result in a new division of 
Europe into the spheres of influence‘s^ ). De.spite this initial criticism, almost all the 
allies, including Turkey's', lias come to view that PfP is an effective and powerful tool 
in strengthening the stability in the East.
The program was a compromi.se of the interests of CEEC, NATO, Russia and the US. 
It includes Russia, the strongest military power in Europe. It is clear that no system 
will guarantee lasting peace in Europe unless it includes Russia. There are currently 
24 countries"''’ participating in the programme. It has transformed the political and 
military relationship of these countries with the Alliance, and has become one of the 
most important features of European security. The PfP has become the instrument of 
choice when these 24 countries and 19 members of the Alliance consult and act 
together in the pursuit of peace and security.
Henry Ki.ssingcr, Washington Post. (25 .Tanuary 1994).
"" Alexander Moneliarenko, “International Institutions and European Security: The Ukrainian 
Dehate,” in European Security and International Institutions after the Cold War, edited by Marco 
Carnovalc, New York, St. Martin’s Prc.ss Inc., 1995, p. 149.
Turkey, as a NATO member, has actively participated in the deliberations towards establishing 
and enhancing the Partnership for Peace (PIP) and launching the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(EAPC) and has wholeheartedly supported the concept of the promotion of practical regional 
cooperation within PfP. Within this context, Turkey opened a PfP Commandership of Education 
Center in Ankara in 1998, which organises courses in various fields “in the spirit o f ’ PIP, bringing 
together officers from PIP member countries. So far, 16 courses have been organised, where 313 
participants from 28 countries have participated. Turkey encouraged the participation of the 
Caucasian and Central Asian States in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and PIP 
programs. Turkey has supported the process of adaptation, which it believes is necessary to 
reinvigorate NATO and render it more Ilexible in responding to the new challenges of the post-Cold 
War era. Duygu Sezer, “Turkey’s role in European Security,” SAM Papers. No. 04/97, Anatolian 
News Agency. (11 January 1999), Turkish Daily News. (17 March 1998), Gulnur Aybet, “Turkey in 
its Geo-Strategic Environment,” in Royal United Services Institute & Brassey’s, Defence Yearbook. 
London, Bras.sey’s, 1992, p. 93-5.
See Appendix C, p. 101.
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The programme went beyond the initial hopes. By developing and strengthening 
dialogue, eooperation and partnership, both allies and partners, saw that there was a 
huge further potential to be tapped. Thus, diseovering that the programme has done a 
good job in projecting security and stability to the east, at the meeting in May 1997 in 
Sintra, Portugal, NATO Foreign Ministers announced the decision to substantively 
enhance the PIP in a number of ways, including the strengthening of political 
consultation, and increasing partner involvement in PfP decision-making, and also 
making PfP, more operational.
The programme has been a clear, coherent plan for responding to the radically 
changed security environment in Europe, where the Soviet Union (SU) and the 
Warsaw Pact (WP) no longer exist. But, in their place, there are multi-dimensional 
and multi-faceted risks and challenges to security and stability in the continent. 
Europe, is not free of possible tensions that can be caused by those risks and 
challenges. The PfP, by developing cooperative military relations and interoperability 
between the allies and partners, enabled its members to embark upon the activities 
that would help them to deal with afore mentioned risks and challenges. It became a 
means of filling vacuum of security and stability in the East that has come with the 
demise of the SU. For those nations who participate actively in this cooperation, and 
who meet the wider obligations, the PfP offers the consultation with the Alliance if the 
partners perceive a direct threat to their territorial integrity, political independence, or 
security; as was the case with Macedonia (FYRM) when NATO launched an air
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campaign against Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999.'^*’ It thus promises “soft” security 
assurances similar to those of Article of the Washington Treaty,'*’* but does not 
promise “hard” security guarantee as promised by Article of the Washington 
Treaty.
The PfP differs significantly in intensity and scope from previous initiatives. It has 
gone beyond and enhances the dialogue and cooperation undertaken through the 
NACC process and moves from general common activities to individual, programmes 
of cooperation between NATO and each of its partners. It was made clear that PfP 
would be tailored to meet the needs and interests of each applicant individually. This 
self-diffeientiation and open-ended character of the PfP, has helped to ease any fears 
of creating new lines of divisions in Europe. PfP’s importance stems from the fact that 
it appears to be the most dynamic and most promising element of a larger European 
security process. Its importance was seen during the process of NATO enlargement 
to Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, when it helped psychologically those NATO 
aspirants who are not included in the first wave of enlargement, not feel abandoned or 
pushed away."’*’
The 19+1 Meeting was held with the Republic of Macedonia on 10 April 1999, NATODOC 
nalodoc@HO.NATO.INT.
“The Parlies will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened,” The Washington 
Treaty, Article IV.
The founding treaty of the NATO, agreed in April 1949.
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised 
hy Article 51 of the Charier of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic 
area,” The Washington Treaty, Article V.
From the conversation with Giilnur Aybet, Instniclor of International Relations at Bilkent 
University. Ankara, during the 1998-99 academic year.
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Tlie programme reinforced the process of European integration by confirming 
NATO’s commitment to enlarge. It has become a means for those states that 
eventually want to be considered for NATO membership to establish an initial 
relationship with the Alliance. And it became an important stage in the first wave of 
NATO enlargement after the cold war. The success and stability of Poland, Hungary 
and Czech Republic in activities in the framework of PIP made them the best 
candidates for NATO membership. Although there is no formal link between PfP and 
enlargement, the first new members to join the Alliance were those who, through their 
full participation in this programme, have demonstrated their ability to contribute to 
the common defence, and to carry out the necessary military reforms at home.
The Partnership forms a basis for future security architecture for free and united 
Europe. It has performed an important confidence-building function and 
supplemented existing pan-European and regional agreements on cooperation and 
exchange of military information. It has given interested states a chance to adapt their 
defence systems to modern European norms and adjust their armed forces to 
collaboration with the armies of the western s t a t e s . H a n s  Jochen Peters, citing 
Richard Holbrooke, argues the forthcoming security architecture constitutes Europe’s 
“fourth architectural moment” (following 1815, 1919, and the late 1940s).“’^
The Partnership programme has a wider, more political dimension, which is the 
promotion of, and commitment to democratic principles. The PfP focuses on the
161 Inlervicw with Ivan Spilda, Embas.sy of the Slovak Republic, (I March 1999), Ankara.
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development of one of those institutions - the military - and, in doing so, nurtures the 
prospects for stability with progress towards democracy. It is expected in the near 
future Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be 
included in the programme. PfP initiative has clearly come a long way in just five 
years. But equally clear is the fact that it still has a long way to go.'*’^  The future of 
the PfP will be determined by the political will and capacity of partners to contribute 
to the programme.
Hans Jochen Peters, “How NATO Must Change: The Political Dimension,” in NATO 
Enlargement: Opinions and Options, edited by Jeffrey Simon, Washington, D.C., NDU, 1995, p.l67.
16.1 Interview with Trajan Petrovski, Ambassador of Macedonia, (24 June 1999), Ankara.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: 
INVITATION
(Press Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the Meeting of tlie North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 Jan. 
1994)
We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North 
Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and longstanding partnership among the 
North American and European Allies, are committed to enhancing security and 
stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the 
democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in 
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other 
European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to 
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would 
welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, 
as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security
developments in the whole of Europe.
We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will
transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This nevv'
programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - 
a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the 
NACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this
programme, to join with us in this partnership. Active participation in the 
Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of 
the expansion of NATO.
The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North 
Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North 
Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the 
North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO 
Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand 
and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase 
stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by 
promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic 
principles that underpin our Alliance.
NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner 
perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or
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security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the 
individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards 
transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence 
ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to 
operate with NATO forces in such Fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue 
and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.
To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, 
within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 
1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite 
states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to 
NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons 
(Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry 
out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.
Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has 
greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work 
with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire 
spectrum of the Alliance’s activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and 
the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer 
permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC 
countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our 
working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.
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APPENDIX B
THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE:
FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT
(Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels 10-11 Jan. 1994)
1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and 
Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member 
states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to 
this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to 
contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic 
area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.
2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that
stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only 
thiough cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, 
justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to
the Partnership.
In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic
Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they
are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom 
from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of 
international law.
They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful 
means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and 
all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commit­
ments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament
and arms control.
3.Thc other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:
a.facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and 
budgeting proces.ses;
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b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to con- tribute, 
subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the 
authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, 
for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their 
ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, 
humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better 
able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic 
Alliance.
4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities 
Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political 
goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for 
Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and 
other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme 
and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with 
NATO an individual Partnership Programme.
5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, 
other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance 
and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with 
NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in 
NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. 
They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary 
and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist 
them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership 
Programmes.
6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings: those who 
envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where 
appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises; they will fund their own 
participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the 
burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part; they may send, after 
appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership 
Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North 
Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the 
Partnership programmes; those participating in planning and military exercises will 
have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability; building upon 
the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO 
countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being 
taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the 
democratic control of armed forces; they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of 
information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within 
the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.
99
7.In keeping with (heir commilmcnt to the objectives of this Partnership 
for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will: develop with the other 
subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and 
evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for 
multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces; 
promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to 
provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other 
subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of 
doctrine.
8.NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that 
Paitner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political 
independence, or security.
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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE MEMBERS
Albania (23 February 1994), Armenia (5 October 1994), Austria (10 February 1995), 
Azerbaijan (4 May 1994), Belarus (II January 1995), Bulgaria (14 February 1994), 
Czech Republic (10 March 1994), Estonia (3 February 1994), Finland (9 May 1994), 
Georgia (23 March 1994), Hungary (8 February 1994), Kazakhstan (27 May 1994), 
Kyrghyz Republic (I June 1996), Latvia (14 February 1994), Lithuania (27 January 
1994), Moldova (16 March 1994), Poland (2 February 1994), Romania (26 January 
1994), Russia (22 June 1994), Slovakia (9 February 1994), Slovenia (30 March 
1994), Sweden (9 May 1994), Switzerland (11 December 1996), The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (15 November 1995), Turkmenistan (10 May 
1994), Ukraine (8 February 1994), Uzbekistan (13 July 1994).
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